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Few doubt the important role that a safe, adequate and af-fordable home plays in individual and community flourish-
ing.1  Few would contest that most Americans are enthralled in
what amounts to an enduring love affair with “home.”2  Yet, the
1 Doubters should see infra  notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
2 This is demonstrated not only by large financial investments in homeownership
and home improvement, but by the cultural meanings associated with “home” which
are closely entwined with other important American values such as “family,” “secur-
ity,” and “privacy.”  In land use law, the single family house sits atop the hierarchy
of uses as the “highest and best use.”  In addition, numerous polls indicate broad
support even for a wide range of housing, including affordable housing.:
Smart Growth America’s October 2000 poll indicates that 66 percent of all
respondents favor a requirement that all new housing developments in-
clude at least 15 percent housing for moderate- and low-income families.
A November 2000 American Planning Association poll indicates that 84
percent of respondents favor providing affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income families.  An October 2000 poll by the Mortgage Bank-
ers Association and the Conference of Mayors cites 74 percent of respon-
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United States has endured a decades-long housing crisis which
past and current housing policies have not solved.  This Article
seeks to open up housing policy to new possibilities through the
application of a type of regulatory regime that helped turn
around America’s environmental policies.
In the late 1960s, a new environmental consciousness was
dawning, even while all levels of government made decisions
harming the environment without any consideration for their
negative effects.  In that era, the federal government did not typi-
cally consider the potential pollution of our air, water or land as
well as likely destruction of animals and plants by federal agen-
cies considering massive construction projects or other major ac-
tions.  Furthermore, the courts did not generally require the
federal government to do so.3  This lack of deliberation about
potential environmental effects may seem odd to some readers
for whom some level of environmental awareness on behalf of
the federal government is taken for granted.  Such reaction is an
indicator of how deeply environmental concerns have become in-
tegrated into our thinking.  However, it was not always so.
In 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).4  NEPA announced a broad goal:  “to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”5
This goal was combined with a modest enforcement mechanism:
the requirement that when a federal agency was considering a
major federal action that would have “significant effect” on the
environment, it must prepare, publish and consider an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) before it made a decision.6
dents saying that affordable housing should be made available to public
servants—such as teachers, firefighters, and police officers—so that they
can live in communities where they work.
DANIELLE ARIGONI, SMART GROWTH NETWORK, AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
SMART GROWTH:  MAKING THE CONNECTION 16 n.28 (2001), [hereinafter ARIGONI],
available at  http://www.smartgrowth.org/pdf/epa_ah-sg.pdf.
3 One significant exception is Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commisssion , 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), which created the “hard look”
doctrine.
4 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f)
(2000).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2003).
6 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).  NEPA was followed by many other environmental stat-
utes, including the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000) and the Clean
Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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Perceiving value in this new regulatory strategy, twenty-eight
jurisdictions adopted various state versions of NEPA in the fol-
lowing thirteen years.7  These statutes applied similar EIS re-
quirements to actions by state agencies and, in some states, to
local governments in their land use decision making, including
zoning and the issuance of permits for proposed developments.8
These state statutes are often referred to as State Environmental
Protection Acts (SEPAs).  While some environmental advocates
were (and are) disappointed with NEPA’s and SEPAs’ lack of
substantive standards and direct control of outcomes, a consider-
able group of researchers and scholars have credited NEPA and
SEPAs with substantial influence in protecting and improving
our environment.9
Contemporary housing problems, such as lack of supply of
housing and lack of affordability, share several characteristics
with environmental issues before the adoption of NEPA.10  Like
the environment, primary housing decisions are made by units of
government (especially local governments) exercising broad dis-
cretion delegated to them by other governmental entities;11 hous-
ing issues are often ignored by local decision-makers, and in
7 Nicolas A. Robinson, SEQRA’s Siblings:  Precedents from Little NEPAs in the
Sister States , 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1157-58 (1982) (listing fifteen jurisdictions which
adopted a statewide comprehensive version of NEPA by statute, four jurisdictions
which adopted comprehensive regulation by gubernatorial executive order, and nine
states which adopted an EIS type procedure for specific limited purposes); DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 12:1-12:2 (2d ed. 2001 & update
2002) [hereinafter MANDELKER, NEPA LAW] (listing sixteen jurisdictions with
NEPA-type state statutes and referring to other jurisdictions that adopted some
other version of NEPA through alternate means).
8 California, Washington and New York apply their state environmental require-
ments to discretionary permits approved by local governments. MANDELKER,
NEPA LAW, supra  note 7, §§ 12:3–12:5.
9 See infra  notes 130-34 and accompanying text.  The American Planning Associa-
tion endorses this regulatory device when it is integrated into the land use planning
and review process. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGIS-
LATIVE GUIDEBOOK (2002), ch. 12.
10 There is some irony in the suggestion that NEPA could be the model for a pro-
affordable housing regulatory scheme. See  Bruce L. Ackerman, Impact Statements
and Low Cost Housing , 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 754 (1973) (identifying the use of
NEPA’s requirements to delay or stop the development of affordable housing and
proposing solutions).
11 Since the widespread adoption of comprehensive zoning following Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365 (1926), local governments have intro-
duced more flexibility devices such as planned unit developments, giving themselves
more discretionary authority over land use development decisions.  Even a proposal
which meets all zoning and planning requirements is often subject to a discretionary
“site plan review.”
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some cases, are treated with hostility; the prospective benefi-
ciaries of thoughtful housing policies are often not involved in
decisions affecting them; decisions harming housing are often
practically irreversible;12 and, importantly, when government
agencies are directed to attend to housing issues, they can  often
adjust their policies to serve both  housing and other policy goals.
Exercising power delegated to them by state governments, lo-
cal governments make most of the important housing decisions.
They largely decide what housing will be developed, how much
of it, what kind, and where. The fundamental problem underly-
ing our housing crisis is the failure of local governments to consist-
ently integrate housing concerns into the wide range of their land
use policies and decisions that actually affect housing.  Framed
another way, the problem is state governments’ failure to ade-
quately regulate local governments’ exercise of delegated discre-
tion in land use decisions that affect housing.  To be sure, state
governments face a complex regulatory problem and substantial
limitations on their capacity to regulate local governments to
serve state housing goals, including our deeply entrenched tradi-
tions of “localism.”  For this and other reasons, previous state
housing policy has not successfully integrated housing concerns
into local government decision making.13
This Article proposes a new type of housing regulatory regime
for addressing America’s housing crisis which combines procedu-
ral mandates and a substantive legislative policy requiring mitiga-
tion of significant housing impacts whenever feasible.14  Modeled
12 For example, when a local government allows commercial development to ex-
haust the available developable land in its jurisdiction, the costs that would be re-
quired to undo this decision so that residential development could replace the
commercial development render the previous decisions practically irreversible.
13 See infra  notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
14 Part III contains a more complete description of a proposed HIA regime.
Briefly, the proposed regime would require local governments to consider whether
any covered action might create any one or more of three types of housing impacts
that would amount to a “significant impact.”  If the action would create such an
impact, the local government must produce a draft housing impact assessment
(DHIA) that discusses the housing impacts, alternative actions that would create
fewer impacts, and measures that could mitigate the housing impacts.  The local gov-
ernment would be required to circulate the DHIA among interested parties for com-
ment and then produce a final housing impact assessment (FHIA) that responds to
the comments.  The local government would be required to consider the FHIA in
making its decision about the contemplated action and to mitigate significant im-
pacts whenever it would be feasible to do so.  A local government could go forward
with an action that would cause a significant unmitigated impact only if it adopted a
statement of overriding concerns (SOC) supported by substantial evidence. The lo-
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on the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the
“housing impact assessment” (HIA) regime is proposed in this
Article for adoption by states and implementation by local gov-
ernments.  A few federal, state, and local policies15 already incor-
porate some form of HIA component, and there are signs of
additional interest in this strategy.16
This Article argues that an HIA requirement could be effec-
tive in promoting states’ housing policies in two distinct regula-
tory paradigms—a traditional interest group representation
paradigm and a “reflexive law” paradigm.  The benefits to hous-
ing from either paradigm would accrue by preventing avoidable
harms to housing that would have occurred without housing im-
pact consideration, by decisions taking advantage of overlooked
possibilities, by housing being more often favored when tradeoffs
were required, and by promoting the adoption of local pro-hous-
ing policies and practices.  Under both paradigms, the HIA re-
gime would treat local governments respectfully and fairly.17  The
HIA also respects the role of the private market as the primary
producer of housing.
Part I describes our nation’s chronic housing crises and the
dual roles that local governments play in contributing to the
problem as well as their capacity to forge solutions.  The analysis
then focuses on the complex challenge facing state governments
regulating local governments’ decisions that affect housing.  It
finds that previous regulatory attempts have been insufficient
and that “our localism” is likely to persist as an enduring limita-
tion to the ability of states to regulate the housing decisions of
local governments.  Thus, a new regulatory strategy that works
within the current limitations is needed.
Part II explains the prima facie case for applying an impact
assessment requirement to housing.  This section then sets impact
assessment strategies into a theoretical framework.  Impact as-
sessment strategies have been conceptualized in six frameworks
cal government would be subject to a lawsuit for failure to produce an HIA when
one was required, for failure to abide by other statutorily-required procedures (e.g.,
dissemination of the DHIA), for producing an inadequate FHIA, or for adopting an
insufficient SOC.  An injunction and/or declaratory relief would be the typical reme-
dies for successful plaintiffs.
15 See infra  note 97.
16 See infra  note 98.
17 Some previous state housing policies, especially regional “fair share” planning
requirements, have been widely criticized as unfair and unrealistic. See infra  notes
73-82 and accompanying text.
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and there are on-going debates about their effectiveness.  The
section concludes that testing the prima facie case requires the
elaboration of a particular regime and the specification of con-
ceptual models.
Part III presents a sketch of an HIA regime primarily based
upon CEQA for purposes of discussion and analysis.
Part IV explores how the model presented in Part III could be
effective in producing important benefits for housing in two dif-
ferent regulatory paradigms.  In the “interest representation reg-
ulatory paradigm,” the requirements promote the formation of
local housing movements, which employ political and legal
means to enforce both the formal rules (the procedural require-
ments) and the legislative policy to mitigate significant housing
impacts when feasible.  In the “reflexive law paradigm,”18 partici-
pation in the mandated processes reforms the informal rules (or
norms) that often guide discretionary decisions.  The housing im-
pact mitigation norm is incorporated into the set of typical norms
that local elected officials embrace.  The shared norm coordi-
nates the activities and interests of participants into a form of
“self-regulation” that produces favorable housing decisions.  The
norm is enforced primarily by non-judicial means.
Concluding that, on balance, an HIA regime would be benefi-
cial under either regulatory paradigm, this Article recommends
that each state adopt an HIA regime tailored to its particular
situation.
I
OUR CHRONIC HOUSING CRISIS AND THE
REGULATORY CHALLENGE FACING STATES
Section A briefly surveys the enduring housing crisis.  Section
B analyzes the dual roles of local governments in both causing
and solving that crisis and concludes that an integrative regula-
tory strategy is needed to adequately address the crisis.  Section
C argues that this need poses a daunting regulatory challenge to
state governments and that no current regulatory model is
adequate.
18 The reflexive law regulatory paradigm is explained infra  notes 204-18 and ac-
companying text.
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A. Our Chronic Housing Crisis
Of all the elements that comprise cities, suburbs, and towns,
housing is perhaps the most complex.  In addition to providing
shelter, housing is also a driver of transportation patterns, a con-
sumption good, a prominent feature of the built environment, an
investment for building wealth, a determinant of social interac-
tion and achievement, and a symbol of familial connections and
personal history.19
Housing problems such as lack of supply,20 lack of af-
fordability,21 overcrowding,22 substandard conditions,23 discrimi-
19 ARIGONI, supra  note 2, at 15.
20 See BIPARTISAN MILLENNIAL HOUSING COMMISSION REPORT, AMERICA’S
HOUSING CHALLENGES 18-27 (May 2002) [hereinafter MHC Report], available at
http://www.mhc.gov/MHCReport.pdf.  This Commission was created by an act of
Congress, Act of Oct. 20, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 206(b), 113 Stat. 1047, 1070. Its
members were appointed by Congress.
21 MHC Report at 15-17.  The standard federal definition of “affordable housing”
is that housing is “affordable” if housing costs consume no more than thirty percent
of a household’s income:  “Most federal programs measure affordability by the rela-
tionship of income to housing costs.  Spending 30 percent to 50 percent of income on
housing is the generally accepted definition of a moderate affordability problem;
spending more than 50 percent is considered a severe affordability problem.” Id . at
15. See also JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING:  2002, at 3 (2002), available at  http://www.jchs.
harvard.edu/publications/markets/Son2002.pdf. (“Overall, some 8.6 million renters
and 6.4 million owners in [the lowest-income households] pay more than 30 percent
of their limited incomes for housing and/or live in structurally inadequate or over-
crowded homes.”); NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, RENTAL HOUS-
ING FOR AMERICA’S POOR FAMILIES:  FARTHER OUT OF REACH THAN EVER (2002)
at  http://www.nlihc.org/oor2002.  (This report measures housing needs by comparing
current wages and rent levels for localities in each of the fifty states and uses this
information to calculate a “housing wage,” the amount of money households in a
specific locality would need to earn to afford a typical apartment unit under the
traditional standard of paying 30 percent of their income or less.  Thirty-seven states
have a housing wage more than twice the prevailing minimum wage of $5.15 per
hour).  For additional illustrations of this phenomena, see CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES, IN SEARCH OF SHELTER:  THE GROWING SHORTAGE OF AF-
FORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING (1998) and other reports at  www.cbpp.org/pubs/ hous-
ing.htm; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, DECENT, AFFORD-ABLE
HOUSING.  IT’S THE AMERICAN DREAM (2001), available at  http://www.nahb.org/
fileUpload_details.aspx?contentTypeID=7 &contentID=16 (last visited on Oct. 21,
2003). See also  publications by the National Housing Conference (NHC), including:
Michael A. Stegman et al., Housing America’s Working Families , NEW CENTURY
HOUSING, June 2000; Paycheck to Paycheck:  Working Families and the Cost of Hous-
ing in America , July 2001, available at  http://www.nhc.org/nhcimages/paycheck.pdf;
Housing America’s Working Families: A Further Exploration (March 2002);
America’s Working Families and the Housing Landscape, 1997–2001 (2001) [herein-
after NHC Publications].
22 See , e.g. , CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROJECT, LOCKED OUT:  CALIFORNIA’S AF-
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nation24 and (more recently) sprawl development25 are serious,
pervasive and chronic in America.  National studies regularly
characterize our housing problems as a “crisis.”26  For decades
these problems have affected millions of working poor, people of
color, the elderly, persons with disabilities and homeless people.
Increasingly, larger segments of the workforce with “good jobs,”
such as teachers, nurses, firefighters, and police officers are also
burdened by housing problems, especially lack of affordability.27
In 1999, just over thirteen million households paid more than
half their income for housing and/or lived in substandard units.28
In 2001, just two years later, this number increased by nine per-
cent to 14.5 million households.29  This figure includes a twenty-
four percent increase (from 3.9 million to 4.8 million) in the num-
ber of low- to moderate-income working households suffering
critical housing needs.30  Furthermore, analysis by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau in 2000 found a rise in the poverty rate and a drop in
the median annual household income for the first time in a dec-
ade which reinforces these concerns.31
FORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS (2000), available at  http://www.cpb.org/2000/r0005
loc.pdf (detailing California’s overcrowding problem).
23 See , e.g. , AFFORDABLE HOUSING STUDY COMMISSION, FLORIDA DEP’T OF
CMTY. AFFAIRS, 2001 FINAL REPORT, available at  http://www.floridacommunityde-
velopment.org/ahsc/2000-2001Report/ahsc_2001_report.pdf [hereinafter FLORIDA
REPORT] (discussing, inter alia , Florida’s substandard housing problems).
24 See , e.g. , U.S. Housing Discrimination Greatly Underreported , Reuters News
Service, Apr. 3, 2002 (while the National Fair Housing Advocacy Alliance compiled
24,000 complaints about housing discrimination in 2001, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development “estimates 2 million people experience some
form of [housing] discrimination based on race, disability, national origin or for
other reasons. . . .”).
25 One way of interpreting the problem addressed by “smart growth” advocates is
that housing has been improperly located, i.e., in sprawled low-density develop-
ments instead of compact downtowns and neighborhoods. See AMERICAN PLAN-
NING ASSOCIATION, POLICY GUIDE ON HOUSING (1999), available at  http://
www.planning.org/policyguides/housing.htm.
26 See , e.g. , CALIFORNIA BUDGET PROJECT, supra  note 22 and FLORIDA REPORT,
supra  note 23.
27 See  NHC Publications, supra  note 21.  For an explanation of why affordability
problems did not decline during the high economic growth of the 1990s, see MHC
Report, supra  note 20, at 18-19.
28 NHC at Work , Sept. 4, 2002, at 1 (reporting the initial results of a study based
on federal data to be released in October, 2002).
29 Id .
30 Id .
31 See CARMEN DENAVAS-WAIT & ROBERT W. CLEVELAND, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES:  2001,
available at  http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-218.pdf.
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Studies demonstrate that the lack of decent affordable housing
has negative impacts on the public’s health, educational attain-
ment, access to jobs, and job advancement.  Long commutes
caused by the lack of affordable housing increase traffic and air
pollution in our communities and reduce workers’ economic pro-
ductivity.32  Other research documents the costs to family life
and community participation caused by housing problems.33  It is
difficult for parents to attend PTA meetings, little league games,
and city council meetings if they have to work overtime or multi-
ple jobs to pay rising housing costs or commute long distances to
their jobs because they cannot find or afford suitable housing
near their work.
The story told by the statistics can be daunting, but also numb-
ingly abstract.  Housing is never merely shelter.  However inade-
quate and temporary, one’s shelter becomes the ground floor for
meeting basic needs, a foundation for job search and education,
and a piece of one’s identity—a “home” of sorts.34  For those
who have always been adequately housed and take it for granted,
a full appreciation for the importance of adequate, decent and
affordable housing can probably only be gained by experiencing
its loss.35
32 See Why Housing Matters , in MHC Report, supra  note 20, at 10-13, and accom-
panying endnotes (citing sources relied upon by the Millennial Housing Commis-
sion); Cheryl P. Derricotte, Poverty and Property in the United States:  A Primer on
the Economic Impact of Housing Discrimination and the Importance of a U.S. Right
to Housing , 40 HOW. L. J. 689 (1997); Justin D. Cummins, Housing Matters:  Why
Our Communities Must Have Affordable Housing , 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197
(2001) (debunking negative myths about affordable housing).  For the impact on
Minnesota residents, see reports by the Family Housing Fund at http://www.
fhfund.org/Research/Default.htm.
33 See , e.g. , Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes:  Rights to Education and to
Family Stability , 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 337, 341-46 (1990). See  Blaine Harden, A
Place Without Roots That Some Call Home , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at A23 (at-
tributing the rootlessness of residents of Stateline, Nevada—which, according to the
2000 census, has the lowest national percentage of residents living in the state where
they were born—largely to the lack of affordable housing).
34 For an interesting exploration of the various meanings of “home” in the law,
see Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home:  A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Chal-
lenge? , 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 580 (2002).
35 Victims rendered homeless from such disasters as flooding or fire often suffer
from depression, anxiety, anger, disillusionment, and/or substance abuse problems.
See  Jenna Hunt, Counselors Tend to Emotional Needs of Flood Victims , COX NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 17, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stores File.  One year
after Hurricane Floyd, flood victims, living in temporary government mobile home
sites, continue to face difficulties finding a home; and it could take two to three years
for them to fully recover from their loss.  Many become frightened and are in shock
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The Housing Act of 1949 established for the first time “a de-
cent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family” as a national goal.36  Unfortunately, neither the efforts of
the private housing market37 nor the efforts of all levels of gov-
ernment combined38 have been adequate to even come close to
meeting the Housing Act’s noble goal.39
Since its first involvement in housing in the 1930s, the federal
government has often played a helpful role in facilitating the fi-
nancing of housing.40  These interventions have been reasonably
when forced to abandon their homes in the dead of the night, “uprooted and thrown
into a chaotic state.” See  Elsa Brenner, Putting Lives Back Together After a Fire ,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, § 13WC (Westchester), at 1.  In 1993, retired and widowed
seventy-five year-old Joseph Rosner lost his home of thirty years to fire. Id.  After
the fire, he lived in a temporary room rented for him by the Red Cross and worried
that he would be unable to afford the rent of temporary housing for the same $228
per month he paid for his old apartment. Id.  Rosner said the experience put his life
“in shambles” and made him “[p]hysically and mentally . . . depressed.” Id.  When
Carl and Sue Wunderlich lost their home to a flood, their biggest concern was
“keeping a roof over [their] kids’ heads.”  Peter T. Kilborn, Flood Victims Find Tor-
tuous Path to U.S. Relief Agency Money , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1993, at A10.  The
couple moved their family to a tent pitched on a mound on a lot where they had
previously planned to build a new house. Id.  A second flood pushed them from this
site and, “with no place else to go,” they moved their family into a house over-
crowded with four other families, also victims of flooding.  The Wunderlich family
eventually received a voucher from the Red Cross to rent an apartment. Id.
36 The Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2002).
37 Most housing units in the United States are produced by private, for-profit de-
velopers.  Housing produced directly by government and by non-profit developers
using government subsidies account for only a small portion of the nation’s total
housing supply.  For an argument that the non-market housing sector should be sub-
stantially expanded, see THE AFFORDABLE CITY:  TOWARD A THIRD SECTOR HOUS-
ING POLICY (John Emmeus Davis ed., 1994).
38 Historically, there has been some public/state production. For a brief descrip-
tion of current federal housing programs, see MHC Report, supra  note 20, at Ap-
pendix 3 “Description of Housing Programs.”
39 For the current housing crisis, see supra  notes 19-33 and accompanying text; for
the governmental response, see supra  notes 36-38 and infra  notes 40-45, and accom-
panying text.
40 See  MHC Report, supra  note 20, at Appendix 3 “Description of Housing Pro-
grams.”  For decades, the federal government (and to some degree state govern-
ments) has adopted policies and spent relatively generously to support the financial
risks of housing developers and buyers, especially single family homeowners.  The
federal government played a critical role in establishing the thirty-year mortgage.
Measured by dollar value, the federal mortgage interest deduction subsidizing
homeownership is the largest federal “housing program.”  Federal programs under
the Federal Housing Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, and the Internal Revenue Service (the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
program) have all contributed significantly to meeting housing needs. See generally
Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999 , 11
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489 (2000).  Attempts to expand the federal government’s
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successful in expanding and stabilizing housing markets and pro-
duction.  Yet, the federal government has never dedicated suffi-
cient resources to meet identified needs.41  It is likely that the
federal government will continue its traditional focus on housing
policy—encouraging and enabling increased private investment
in residential development and making limited resources availa-
ble to subsidize certain housing development and related
efforts.42
The role of state governments in housing is a mixed one and
intimately intertwined with the critical role of local governments.
Since the 1920s, states have delegated extensive land use powers
to local governments.43  These land use powers include the au-
thority to zone and otherwise regulate land and to grant or deny
discretionary land use permits.44  Using the police power dele-
gated to them by state governments, local governments make
many of the most important policies and decisions which affect
all of our critical housing problems, including increasing or re-
role by establishing a national land use policy have been unsuccessful. See  Robert
W. Oast, Jr., Incentives for Economic Development in Underserved Communities and
for Affordable Housing:  A Selective Look at Legislative Initiatives in the 106th Con-
gress , 33 URB. LAW. 793 (2001); see , e.g. , Shelby D. Green, The Search for a Na-
tional Land Use Policy:  For the Cities’ Sake , 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 69 (1998). But
see  Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development:  Threads of a
National Land Use Policy , 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381 (2002) (describing the develop-
ment of a de facto  national land use policy).
41 For example, the recent Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission (MHC) re-
ported that only one-third of those eligible for federal rental housing assistance actu-
ally receive it. See  MHC Report, supra  note 20, at 14. See also  the National
Housing Conference’s frank Proposal in: UNITED STATES MILLENNIAL HOUSING
COMMISSION:  HOW TO ADDRESS AMERICA’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS, 2
(June 15, 2001), at  http://www.nhc.org/nhcimages/mhcresp.pdf (calling for a “Mar-
shall Plan” for housing).
42 See generally , Principal Recommendations to Congress , MHC Report, supra
note 20, at 27–70.  The Commission’s second principal recommendation is to
“[d]evolve decision making to states and local governments, but within a framework
of federal standards and performance objectives.” Id . at 27–28. See also id.  at 26
(“Decisions about the location and management of affordable housing are best
made by state or local governments, rather than the federal government.”).
43 After the United States Supreme Court validated the constitutionality of com-
prehensive zoning by local governments in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty , 272
U.S. 365 (1926), and the U.S. Department of Commerce promoted zoning through
its publishing of “A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipali-
ties May Adopt Zoning Regulations” (1926), most states soon passed zoning ena-
bling acts.
44 See JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEIR & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLAN-
NING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW §§ 3.5-3.6; §§ 4.1-4.2 (1998); DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 4.15-4.16 (5th ed. 2003).
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ducing housing supply and either including or excluding afforda-
ble housing.45
Some reasonable policy justifications support this delegation of
power.  The primary traditional justifications for this delegation
of broad discretionary authority are that only local governments
have the local knowledge and expertise to make these decisions,
that the residents of local government have to live with the con-
sequences of land use decisions, and that decisions on housing
issues must be balanced with all the other issues that local gov-
ernments must decide.46
While the causes of the housing crisis are under continual de-
bate, many scholars, developers and a series of national commis-
sions47 place substantial responsibility on local governments’
45 “[E]ducation and zoning are the principal operations of local governments.”
Richard Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law ,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I].  Local
governments typically set the limits for actual residential development by enacting
and applying their planning codes and zoning ordinances to the land within their
jurisdiction and to any particular residential proposal.  Most proposals for new resi-
dential construction require one or more discretionary land use approvals from the
local government where they are to be sited.  If a local government zones most of its
developable land for commercial and retail use, it forces other communities to pro-
vide housing for its workers.  If a local government adopts planning codes and zon-
ing ordinances favoring large-lot single family housing over more dense residential
development, it reduces the housing supply that its land will provide.  If a local gov-
ernment rejects proposals for lower-cost housing or multifamily housing because of
“not-in-my-backyard opposition,” it fails to supply those types of housing to meet
these housing needs in its jurisdiction.  If a jurisdiction’s existing stock of affordable
housing is demolished to make way for new development, the local government’s
failure to preserve that housing increases the demand for affordable housing.
46 Id.  at 5.  These reasons are suggestive of what Professor Briffault calls the “de-
centralization of power” model justifying localism.
47 See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON URBAN HOUS., A DECENT HOME (1969) (fi-
nal report of committee formerly call the Kaiser Committee); NAT’L COMM’N ON
URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY (1969).  For the Kerner Com-
mission, see John Charles Boger, The Urban Crisis:  The Kerner Commission Report
Revisited , 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289 (1993); PRESIDENT BUSH’S ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991) (finding local gov-
ernment regulation is a “major factor”).  The current Bush administration has re-
vived the Regulatory Barriers Clearinghouse, a “web-based forum [which] offers
builders and developers from around the country the ability to share ideas and solu-
tions for overcoming state and local regulatory barriers to affordable housing,” at
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr03-069.cfm. See also THE BROOK-
INGS INSTITUTE, CENTER ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, The Link Be-
tween Growth Management and Housing Affordability:  The Academic Evidence , 6-
8, February 2002, available at  http://www.brookings.edu/es/ urban/publications/
growthmanage-xsum.htm [hereinafter Brookings Institute, Growth Management]
(acknowledging that “traditional zoning and other planning and land use controls
limit the supply and accessibility of affordable housing”; examples include:  “re-
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exercise of land use powers.  Commentators do not always agree
on why  local governments are to blame or how  local govern-
ments’ policies should be revised, but all agree that local govern-
ments bear substantial responsibility for unmet housing needs.
B. The Dual Role of Local Governments
In their exercise of land use power, local governments largely
determine what  housing development occurs, how much , when
and where .48  Most important land use decisions by local govern-
ments are discretionary, and are decided by a mix of law and
politics.49  The housing needs of the jurisdiction’s current and fu-
ture residents are often not a primary consideration in many de-
cisions that impact these needs.  Sometimes, housing needs are
avoided directly, as in the case of slow and no growth cities, by
restricting infrastructure expenditures or engaging in exclusion-
ary zoning.50  Many local governments have consistently over
zoned land for industrial and/or commercial uses with the effect
that the potential supply of housing (especially affordable hous-
ing) is severely limited.51  Often localities deny approval to meri-
quirements for low-density only, minimum housing size, or bans against attached or
cluster homes. . . . This ‘chain of exclusion’ is a powerful reality for limiting the
affordability of housing in certain jurisdictions.”). Id.  at Executive Summary.
48 See  Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45.  Certainly, lack of financing
is a serious obstacle to meeting our nation’s housing needs.  Because federal and
state governments have more resources than local governments they should play a
greater role in financing housing.  It also must be stressed that in many cases states
themselves arguably cause local governments to ignore housing problems.  For ex-
ample, many state tax policies create incentives for local governments to engage in
“fiscal zoning” that pushes local governments to prefer revenue-producing land uses
over needed housing.  Nevertheless, without appropriately zoned land, available in-
frastructure and local governments’ land use approvals, even a fully-financed hous-
ing proposal, goes nowhere.  Thus, local governments are a necessary focal point for
addressing our housing crisis.
49 See generally RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MULTIPLE PRACTICES
AND POLICIES (1966).
50 The vast exclusionary zoning literature and the literature on slow and no
growth cities attest to this fact. See , e.g. , Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note
45, at 40-43; BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, Growth Management , supra  note 47, ch. 5.
51 Over-zoning for industrial or commercial uses in order to collect tax revenues—
the “fiscalization of land use”—is common.  However, sometimes localities over-
zone for single-family housing instead of zoning sufficiently for multi-family housing.
The 1000 Friends of Oregon successfully attacked the City of Portland’s large, mini-
mum-lot-size zoning “based on research showing that half the housing demand in
the 1970s in Portland was for multi-family housing while only seven percent of the
land was zoned for multi-family housing . . . [T]he same land base that could support
only 129,000 housing units in 1978, supported 305,000 units by 1983 because of the
reduction in minimum lot sizes to reflect true consumer demand.”  Terry J. Tondro,
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torious but controversial affordable housing developments.52  At
other times, housing needs are simply ignored and opportunities
for meeting housing needs and other objectives are simultane-
ously overlooked.53  Moreover, planners and local government
officials often ignore both the vestiges of past discrimination in
land use patterns and are inattentive to discriminatory effects of
current decisions affecting housing.54
An example of a common missed opportunity to consider and
address the potential housing impacts of a land use decision is
the approval of a new commercial or retail development.55  Most
jurisdictions seek to attract such development because it gener-
ates tax revenue and creates jobs.  A retail development, such as
a big box retailer, may also create significant housing impacts in
the host jurisdiction because the new employment it generates
attracts new residents to live in the host jurisdiction.  However,
the wages paid to those employees may not enable the new work-
ers to afford the housing available in the host jurisdiction.56  If
the host jurisdiction does not mitigate some part of these housing
2001 Gallivan Conference:  Sprawl and Its Enemies:  An Introductory Discussion of
Two Cities’ Efforts to Control Sprawl , 34 CONN. L. REV. 511, 535 (2002).
52 A substantial amount of literature documents the “not-in-my-backyard” phe-
nomenon.  For a collection of sample treatments, see Tim Iglesias, Managing Local
Opposition to Affordable Housing:  A New Approach to NIMBY , 12 J. OF AFFORD-
ABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 78, note 5 (2002) [hereinafter Iglesias, Managing
Local Opposition].
53 For example, a recent review of the minutes of twenty-nine local jurisdictions
from thirteen states which post their planning commission minutes on the
www.municode.org website found that, in each case where proposals for new com-
mercial development were under consideration, potential housing impacts of these
developments were not discussed.  Data from this analysis is on file with author.
54 See  Charles Hoch, Racism and Planning , 59 J. AM. PLAN. INST. 451 (1993)
(“[M]ost planning professionals, like most Americans, do not give racism much
thought.  Planners rarely study racism or write about it in their professional journals,
even though the rare analysis has uncovered evidence of continuing racial discrimi-
nation despite civil rights reforms.”); see also  John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and
Found:  The Fair Housing Act at Thirty , 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067 (1998) (critically
evaluating the limited success of the fair housing act in reducing discrimination and
racial segregation).
55 The rapid pace of new office and commercial development in the suburbs high-
lights the importance of this example.  David Brooks, For Democrats, Time to Meet
the Exurban Voter , N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 4 p.3 (“Before 1980, says Robert
Lang, a demographer at Virginia Tech, only a quarter of all office space was in the
suburbs.  But about 70 percent of the office space created in the 1990’s [sic] was in
suburbia, and now 42 percent of all offices are located there.”).
56 This kind of housing impact analysis is now common. See  Jane E. Schukoske,
Housing Linkage:  Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs , 76 IOWA L.
REV. 1011 (1991). See also infra  note 64 and accompanying text.
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impacts,57 the development creates spillover housing impacts—
the employees will have to live in neighboring jurisdictions and
will cause additional traffic and pollution by commuting.  In such
a case, local jurisdictions attending to the potential housing im-
pacts have a variety of means within their delegated land use
power to address them.  For example, they may seek a contribu-
tion from the commercial developer to a housing trust fund that
subsidizes housing for workers; they may negotiate with the de-
veloper to revise the project to be a mixed use development; they
may rezone some land previously zoned commercial to residen-
tial use, or increase the density of land already zoned residential,
to increase the likelihood of additional housing being developed
in the jurisdiction.
There are a variety of explanations for local governments’ lack
of attention to housing, including conflicting priorities, fiscal rea-
sons, exclusionary desires, or a combination of these and other
reasons.  Another reason that local governments ignore the hous-
ing impacts of their land use and development decisions is that,
typically, cities deliberate about these decisions without the par-
ticipation of those who need the housing that could be produced
in that locality.58  This lack of participation by the intended regu-
latory beneficiaries (from the state’s point of view) certainly ac-
counts, in part, for the restrictive policies and practices of many
local governments.59
A corollary of local governments being a significant part of the
problem is that, with certain limitations, they can be particularly
effective in promoting housing, including affordable housing.60
57 The assumption is that only some of the new workers will want to live in the
host jurisdiction.
58 See , e.g. , CLAN CRAWFORD, JR., MICHIGAN ZONING AND PLANNING, THE IN-
STITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 4 (3d ed. 1988) (“another problem
with the highly political nature of zoning controversies is that in most of them there
are rather important interests that are not represented . . . [for example,] the tenants
of the proposed apartments or mobile home park.”).
59 Cities may sometimes include housing developers (the regulated entities from
the local government perspective) in the formulation of housing policy, e.g., in
mandatory housing planning regimes.  However, the policies likely to result through
such a process will depend upon the composition of the developers and their inter-
ests, policies that may not coincide with the broad range of existing and future hous-
ing needs.
60 The most obvious limit to local governments’ capacity to address housing needs
is financial.  Typically, housing as land use costs a locality more in services that must
be provided than revenues contributed in taxes.  A comprehensive solution to our
chronic housing crisis demands either a restructuring of local governments’ finances
to address this imbalance, or a substantial commitment of government resources at
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Local governments can work effectively with housing developers,
employers, banks, community organizations, adjacent localities
and the state to ensure that at least a significant amount of their
housing needs are met.61  Local governments can be particularly
effective in promoting housing, including affordable housing,
when they are aware of the possibilities and use their best efforts
to collect the necessary resources.62  Importantly, two of the most
recent “progressive” housing policies that have flourished in the
last twenty years, e.g., inclusionary zoning63 and housing impact
fees,64 emerged and have been adopted almost exclusively at the
the federal and state levels.  For a broad array of examples of how local govern-
ments can promote housing development, see ASSOCIATION OF BAY AREA GOV-
ERNMENTS, BLUEPRINT 2001, HOUSING ELEMENT IDEAS AND SOLUTIONS FOR A
SUSTAINABLE AND AFFORDABLE FUTURE, BAY AREA HOUSING (2001) (providing
suggestions, model policies, and contacts for local governments to increase afforda-
ble housing in their jurisdictions); THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS,
NATIONAL HOUSING AGENDA:  A SPRINGBOARD FOR FAMILIES, FOR COMMUNITIES,
FOR OUR NATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE MAYORS’ NATIONAL HOUSING
FORUM (2002) (offering sixty housing policy recommendations addressing a wide
array of housing needs). See also , The Affordable City:  Toward a Third Sector
Housing Policy  (John Emmeus Davis ed., 1994); GREENBELT ALLIANCE, SMART IN-
FILL:  CREATING MORE LIVABLE COMMUNITIES IN THE BAY AREA (2002) (provid-
ing advice to civic leaders and citizens on how “infill development” can help the San
Francisco Bay Area housing situation, detailing twelve strategies for achieving liva-
ble communities and sustainable development through infill housing and mixed-use
development, including housing for people at all income levels).
61 See , e.g. , Richard A. Judd & David Paul Rosen, Inclusionary Housing in Cali-
fornia:  Creating Affordability Without Public Subsidy , 2 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 4, 6 (1992) (explaining how local governments requiring developers
of new residential construction to include a designated percentage of affordable
housing in their developments can use a wide variety of measures to mitigate the
costs).  National Housing Commission, Inclusionary Zoning:  Lessons Learned in
Massachusetts , 2 NAT’L HOUSING COMM’N AFFORDABLE HOUSING POL’Y REV. 1
(2002) offers a hopeful note:  researchers found a genuine desire by more than a
third of the state’s cities and towns to change their zoning in order to increase the
development of affordable housing.
62 For example, when the City of Santa Rosa, California, was presented with a
proposal for the development of a new Safeway on land designated in part for com-
mercial development and in part for medium-density residential development, the
city refused Safeway’s request to redesignate the residential portion as commercial,
leading Safeway to build housing as part of its project.  Telephone interview with
Wayne Goldman, City of Santa Rosa Planning Director (Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with
author).
63 Inclusionary zoning programs generally require residential developers to either
make some portion of the units they build affordable to specified income levels or
require the developers to make some other contribution to housing affordability in
the jurisdiction, e.g., by a donation of land or money to a housing subsidy fund.
64 Housing impact fee programs generally require commercial developers to con-
tribute money to a housing subsidy fund.  The amount of their required contribution
is usually based upon the number of jobs they are expected to generate and the
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local government level.65  This crucial positive role that local gov-
ernments can play in addressing housing needs is often neglected,
but is essential for a solution to our housing crisis.66
resulting housing demands the host jurisdiction expects from new residents.  These
ordinances have been the subject of numerous lawsuits and law review articles. See ,
e.g. , Commercial Builders of No. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that Sacramento commercial building impact fee meets Nollan “es-
sential nexus” test). See also supra  note 56.
65 For examples of local inclusionary zoning programs, see Nico Calavita & Ken-
neth Grimes, Inclusionary Housing in California:  The Experience of Two Decades ,
64 J. OF THE AM. PLANNING ASS’N 150 (1998); Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalita-
rian’s Market:  The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed , 24 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 23 (1996); Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning for All:  Using Inclusio-
nary Zoning Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing , 44 EMORY L. J. 359 (1995);
Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at its
Viability , 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995).  Montgomery County, Maryland enacted
a regional inclusionary zoning law called “Moderately Priced Housing Law” in 1974.
See  Jay Walljasper, A Fair Share in Suburbia; Housing Policy of Mongomery County,
Maryland , THE NATION, Jan. 25, 1999, at 15-21.  Inclusionary zoning was endorsed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court as a method of fulfilling the “fair share” obliga-
tion of New Jersey’s Constitution in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison , 371 A.2d 1192, 1227 (N.J. 1977), and was subsequently endorsed by the
New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing (the state agency charged with imple-
menting New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 329
(1985)).  A 1993 bill considered by the California legislature (Assembly Bill 1684,
Hauser and Farr) would have required local governments to adopt an inclusionary
zoning program. See  Barbara Erlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary
Zoning:  Successfully Creating Affordable Housing , 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971 (2002).
See also two recent evaluative reports:  The Center for Housing Policy, Inclusionary
Zoning:  A Viable Solution to the Affordable Housing Crisis? , 1 NEW CENTURY
HOUSING 2 (Oct. 2000); California Coalition for Rural Housing and Non-Profit
Housing Association of Northern California, Inclusionary Housing in California:  30
Years of Innovation  (2003).  For a local government perspective on inclusionary zon-
ing ordinances, see Institute for Local Self Government, California Inclusionary
Housing Reader  (2003).  Rent control, another local government policy intended to
promote housing, is highly controversial in its medium and long term effects on
housing supply.  Nevertheless, rent control is allowed by some states and survives in
some communities.
66 The range of performance on housing issues that local governments can present
is evidenced in a recent study of local governments in the San Francisco Bay Area
that was published in the form of a report card.  Non-Profit Housing Association of
Northern California and Greenbelt Alliance, San Francisco Bay Area Housing Crisis
Report Card  (June 2002) (copy on file with author).  Of the forty most important
cities in the region, seven were cited as “honor roll,” four as “good,” six as “needs
improvement,” and twelve were given a failing grade.  Eleven others were awarded
an “incomplete” because they had not provided necessary information for the study.
Id.  at 3.  And when state funding for housing is available, many local governments
as well as civic and community leaders are eager to access it.  John R. Nolon, Grass-
roots Regionalism Through Intermunicipal Land Use Compacts , 73 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1011, 1012 (1999) (“[T]hose who argue that the New York State legislature
should adopt a strong regional approach to land use planning and regulation do so,
in part, because they perceive a need to coordinate the often disconnected and dis-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 19  4-MAR-04 10:49
Housing Impact Assessments 451
C. The Regulatory Challenge Facing State Governments
Any attempt to resolve our housing problem must keep the
dual role of local governments in view, support local govern-
ments’ potential for solutions, and simultaneously restrain prac-
tices that ignore or exacerbate the problem.  This can only occur
if housing issues are regularly considered in local governments’
policy and decision making. Fundamentally, housing suffers from
not being consistently integrated into the whole range of local gov-
ernments’ policy and decision making :  zoning, fiscal policy, infra-
structure decisions, and discretionary approvals of proposed
developments.  These decisions are often critical in determining
whether housing is developed at all, and if so, what kinds, where,
how much, and for whom.67  What is needed is an integrative  reg-
ulatory strategy.  While this integrative focus on the broad range
of local governments’ land use powers is now widely viewed as
important and appropriate,68 there is currently no broadly ap-
plied regulatory mechanism by which the housing impacts of lo-
cal governments’ decisions are regularly infused into the whole
cordant land use decisions of local governments.  The danger in this observation is
that it identifies local control as the problem to be cured rather than the base on
which to build an inter-municipal process that is responsive to regional needs.”).  For
a parallel argument in the environmental field, see John R. Nolon, In Praise of Paro-
chialism:  The Advent of Local Environmental Law , 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365
(2002) (documenting local governments’ adoption of environmentally protective
laws).
67 Norman Williams, Jr., The Three Systems of Land Use Control (Or, Exclusion-
ary Zoning and Revision of the Enabling Legislation) , 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 80
(1970).  In a 1970 critique of the Model Code for Land Development, Professor
Norman Williams, Jr. wisely noted how in considering the housing crisis a myopic
focus on zoning ignores the two other systems of local governments’ land use con-
trol—local fiscal policy and infrastructure decisions. See also  John M. Payne, Nor-
man Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine:  Making the
Theory Fit the Facts , 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 684 (1996) (agreeing with Professor Wil-
liams’ insight).  A recent case exemplifies the issue. In Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v.
Township of Cherry Hill , 802 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2002), a developer sought to pay fees to
a city’s housing fund in lieu of subjecting its land to classification as available for
fulfilling the jurisdiction’s share of regional housing.  The court found that available
land itself is key to provision of future affordable housing.  From the standpoint of
local governments or potential residents, fees are not the functional equivalent of
developable land.
68 For example, such an integrative perspective is assumed in “smart growth” and
sustainable development discussions. See , e.g. , AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIA-
TION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK (2002). See also NATIONAL AS-
SOC. OF HOME BUILDERS, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON SMART GROWTH (endorsing
voluntary comprehensive planning including housing, commercial development, in-
frastructure development and financing) available at  http://www.nahb.org/ ge-
neric.aspx?sectionID=636&genericContentID=3519 (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
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range of local governments’ decisions that actually affect
housing.69
Because local governments’ land use power is regulated by
states, state policy has long been a major focal point for the pro-
motion of housing.70  Since the Housing Act of 1949 was enacted,
legislators, developers and housing advocacy groups have sought
state legislative reform to revise local governments’ housing poli-
cies and practices to achieve their goals.71  Two state housing reg-
ulatory policies that attempt to promote an integrative policy
deserve comment.72
69 Florida and a few other states impose a special review process for “develop-
ment of regional impact” (DRIs) which include requirements for consideration of
housing impacts.  However, these requirements, while valuable, are not widespread
and only are applied to a narrow class of decisions regarding specific developments.
70 Housing advocates also sought reform through litigation in both federal and
state courts.  No individual federal constitutional right to housing has been estab-
lished. See  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).  A few state supreme courts
(including Pennsylvania and New York) followed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
famous Mt. Laurel  decision, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel
Township , 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983), in finding a state constitutional requirement
that each local government ensure reasonable opportunities for the provision of its
“fair share” of regional housing needs.  New Jersey’s Mt. Laurel  approach has had
limited success.  Neither Pennsylvania (Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township
Bd. of Adjustment, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965)), New York (Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 341 N.E.2d, 236 (N.Y. 1975)), nor the other handful of states whose courts
have invalidated exclusionary zoning on state constitutional grounds have pursued
the doctrine as vigorously as New Jersey. State-Sponsored Growth Management as a
Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning , 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127, 1131-32 (1995).
California’s Supreme Court made a foray in Mt. Laurel ’s direction in its Livermore
decision, Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore , 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976), but rejected Mt. Laurel ’s doctrine, pronounced
its own formula for reviewing local governments’ decisions to ensure they take into
account the “regional welfare.”  While litigation aimed at establishing new housing
rights or restricting local government’s exercise of land use authority by close judi-
cial review has borne some fruit, the author of the Note believes that the potential
for this approach is limited because of the contemporary tendency of courts to be
less “activist” on housing issues.  Federal fair housing law and state equivalents have
provided some important protection from housing discrimination for members of
protected classes in the land use context, and this has been an important remedy.
However, most local governments’ exercises of discretion that harm housing are not
actionable as “discrimination” under fair housing law.
71 The “Quiet Revolution” raised great hopes for a resurgence of state regulation
of local governments’ discretion in land use matters. See  David L. Callies, The Quiet
Revolution Revisited:  A Quarter Century of Progress , 26 URB. LAW. 197 (1994); Fred
Bosselman & David Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control , Council on
Environmental Quality (1971).  The “Quiet Revolution” was a term coined to refer
to a pattern of states’ reassertion of regulatory authority over local governments in a
wide variety of contexts.  Unfortunately, to date, the “Quiet Revolution” has not
delivered substantial benefits to housing.
72 As discussed, some local governments have adopted their own self-regulation
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 21  4-MAR-04 10:49
Housing Impact Assessments 453
Since 1973, Florida’s “development of regional impact” (DRI)
policy has required additional review of proposed developments
that are judged as having regional impacts.73  This review pro-
cess, encouraged by the American Law Institute’s Model Land
Development Code,74 includes an analysis of potential housing
impacts conducted using a state-approved methodology.75  The
policy imposes upon project applicants a duty to mitigate any sig-
nificant regional impacts, including housing impacts, as defined
by predetermined thresholds.  This regulatory program has had
some success, and few other states have adopted versions of it.76
However, this regulation is only applied to a few specific large
development projects rather than the broad range of local gov-
ernments’ development decisions that may have important con-
sequences for housing.  For this reason, this regulatory program
has been criticized as ineffective and unfair.
Some “comprehensive housing planning requirements” at-
tempt to be integrative.  Eight states have adopted some version
of a mandatory housing planning regime.77  These largely proce-
to consider housing impacts in limited circumstances of reviewing commercial devel-
opment proposals. See supra  note 64.  However, like the DRI programs, these regu-
lations only require housing impact analysis of some specific development proposals
and do not apply to other local governments’ policy and decision making.
73 FLA. STAT. Ch. 380.06 (2003); FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. 9J-2 (2003).
74 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A Model Land Development Code , Art. VII, § 7-
301(1) (1976).
75 Two methodologies have been developed.  One by the Florida Department of
Community Affairs, and another by the East Central Florida Regional Planning
Council (ECFRPC) which as been approved for use throughout the state.  The latter
version can be downloaded from the ECFRPC website at  www.ecfrpc.org/Main/
Main.asp?CategoryID=4&SubCategoryID=6&ContentID=15& (last visited Oct. 30,
2003).
76 For a detailed description of the Florida DRI program, see Marya Morris, Reg-
ulating Regional Impacts:  Toward Model Legislation:  Part I , LAND USE LAW 3, 5-7,
July 1995. See also  Mitchell Waldman, Developments of Regional Impact , 22 FLA.
JUR. 2D ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 28 (1998). See  Jeffrey Bercow,
Modifying Approved Developments of Regional Impact , 61 FLA. B. J. 67 (1987).
Connecticut, Vermont, Georgia, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Washington have
each adopted some version of a DRI program.  For an analysis and comparison of
various states’ versions of DRIs, see Marya Morris, Regulating Regional Impacts:
Toward Model Legislation:  Part I , LAND USE LAW, 3-9 (July 1995); Marya Morris,
Regulating Regional Impacts:  Toward Model Legislation:  Part II , LAND USE LAW,
3-8 (August 1995).  For a description and evaluation of DRIs, see Briffault, Our
Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45, at 64-70.
77 See , e.g. , CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65300—65590.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161—3215, 186.001—187.201 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-70-1—5, 50-8-30—46 (1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§§ 4312—4349 (West 1978 & Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§  197.005—.860 (1991);
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dural requirements usually apply to all local governments.  Three
states, New Jersey, Florida, and California, have adopted com-
prehensive mandatory planning requirements with highly specific
directions for local governments to plan for their “fair share” of
regional housing needs.  In these regimes, each municipality is
required to plan so it is possible for the types and amounts of
housing to be built in its jurisdiction that correspond to the juris-
diction’s own local needs plus its share of the regional housing
needs.  In some states, such as California, the scope of planning
extends in principle to the whole range of decisions that could
affect housing.  Arguably, these comprehensive housing planning
requirements force local governments to consider all aspects of
land use policy at once during the time they are preparing their
housing plans, in California every five years.  But this mechanism
only actually performs the integration function if the plans are
regularly consulted and have some force in actual decision mak-
ing.  Most comprehensive planning regimes rely on “consistency
findings” for their effect,78 but these have been widely criticized
as ineffective.79  In practice, plan implementation by requiring a
finding of “consistency” with the adopted plan has not success-
fully integrated housing concerns into local governments’ actual
decision making.80  In addition, comprehensive mandatory plan-
ning requirements that incorporate “fair share” standards are
persistently challenged by local governments who argue that the
fair share numbers are not an “objective” measure of their cur-
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-22.2-1—22.2-14 (1991), VT. ST. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4387
(1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 36.70.010—70.980, 36.70A.010-.902 (West 1991
& Supp. 1993). See JOHN M. DEGROVE, PLANNING & GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN
THE STATES (1992).
78 A “consistency requirement” mandates that, when making certain kinds of de-
cisions, a locality must make a finding in the record that the decision is consistent
with its housing plan.
79 For a review of states’ consistency requirements, see Stuart Meck, The Legisla-
tive Requirement that Zoning and Land Use Controls Be Consistent with an Indepen-
dently Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan:  A Model Statute , 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 295 (2000).
80 Unlike an impact assessment regime, the local government may simply make
the required finding without any investigation as to the actual potential conse-
quences (viz. potential inconsistencies) that a decision may have with its adopted
plan.  It is only required to affirm on the record that the action comports with its
plan.  Nor are interested stakeholders invited to participate in the consideration of
whether such consistency exists and what alternatives or mitigations might make an
action more consistent with the adopted housing plan.  In some states, interested
parties do have a right to challenge the jurisdiction’s finding of consistency in court.
However, such litigation is rare and rarely successful.
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rent and future housing needs but are arbitrary, unrealistic, and
unfair.81  Even undisputed housing advocates such as Mt. Lau-
rel’s champion Professor John Payne confess doubt about the ac-
curacy and usefulness of regional housing need numbers.82
In addition to designing an effective regulatory strategy inte-
grating housing concerns into local governments’ land use deci-
sions and policy making, states’ regulation of local governments’
exercise of discretionary land use power in housing confronts a
second challenge:  pursuing state goals while respecting the spe-
cial competence and traditional local authority that local govern-
ments claim.  In a famous pair of articles, Professor Briffault
traced the history of local governments’ power and tendencies
towards parochialism which he termed “localism.”83  Local gov-
81 Cities’ opposition to their fair share requirement imposed by Mt. Laurel litiga-
tion are regularly mentioned in articles describing that litigation.  For a description
of how complicated the application of regional fair share housing obligations can
become, see Fair Share Housing Ctr., Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill , 802 A.2d 512,
514-19 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2002) (providing a factual analysis of city’s fair share housing
obligation).
82 John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest , 96 MICH. L. REV.
1685, 1709 (1998) reviewing CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SEIGE:  RACE,
SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) (“in practice, the fair-share rules are too
complicated to be readily understood, too arbitrary and counterintuitive on occasion
to be perceived as fair—the sprawl problem—and, despite their superficial objectiv-
ity, too subjective to be anchored unambiguously in the vague language of the con-
stitution”).  In an earlier article, John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share:  The Judicial
Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies , 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20 (1987), Professor
Payne proposed a growth share requirement in which local governments would be
required to produce housing in some specified proportion to their actual contribu-
tion to housing needs as measured by their growth in the previous period.  This
“growth share” proposal moves toward a solution more likely to be accepted as
“fair” by local governments because the standard is, at least to some degree, a func-
tion of the state of affairs created by local jurisdictions’ own actions.  However, Pro-
fessor Payne’s proposal still offers a state-imposed percentage that ultimately
substitutes one contestable standard for another. See also  John M. Payne, Remedies
for Affordable Housing:  From Fair Share to Growth Share , LAND USE LAW, 3–9
(June 1997); John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount
Laurel Doctrine:  Making the Theory Fit the Facts , 20 VT. L. REV. 665 (1996).
83 See  Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45; Richard Briffault, Our Lo-
calism:  Part II—Localism and Legal Theory , 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) [herein-
after Biffault, Our Localism:  Part II].  More recently, Professors Briffault and
Barron have explored the complexity of localism in practice and its relationships to
regionalism and federalism. See  Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism , 48
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000) [hereinafter Biffault, Localism and Regionalism] (“[I]n
the metropolitan areas that dominate America at the end of the twentieth century,
regionalism is not simply the enemy of localism; it is also localism’s logical exten-
sion.”); see also  David J. Barron, Commentary:  A Localist Critique of Federalism ,
51 DUKE L.J. 377, 378-79 (2001) (“[L]ocal autonomy is a more complex concept than
we often acknowledge. [. . .] The ability of each locality to make effective decisions
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ernments cling tenaciously to their land use authority and ac-
tively resist any perceived infringement, especially in states with
strong “home rule” traditions.84  Thus, since the New Jersey Su-
preme Court’s Mt. Laurel  decisions,85 debates about states con-
trolling the discretion of local governments to serve housing
needs have often been framed by the issues of how intrusive state
government should be (e.g., override or provide incentives) and
by what regulatory mechanism states could force more or less
reluctant or recalcitrant local governments to both remove their
own regulatory obstacles and to act affirmatively in furthering
the development of housing, especially affordable housing.
The recent ascendancy of “smart growth” and “sustainable de-
velopment” promoters has once again raised the possibility of
“regionalism.”  Strong regionalism—defined as structural reform
reallocating significant land use authority from local govern-
ments to regional bodies—is arguably a “first best” solution for
controlling the land use discretion of local governments, includ-
ing in the housing arena.86  The shortcomings of traditional local
governments’ land use control has been thoroughly criticized.87
Strong regionalism would enable a regional entity with broader
on its own is inevitably shaped by its relation to other cities and states, by its relation
to broader, private market forces, and, most importantly, by the way the central
power structures these relations. . . .” Id.  at 378-79.).  The proposal offered in this
Article is consistent with Briffault’s recognition of “the value of a combination of
localist and regionalist policies and institutions rather [than] either a totally frag-
mented localist system or the consolidation of all local government decision making
at the regional level.”  Briffault, supra , Localism and Regionalism , at 22.
84 See  Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45, and Briffault, Localism and
Regionalism , supra  note 83, at 15-18 (2000) (reviewing the traditional case for local-
ism as promoting “allocational efficiency in the provision of public services, demo-
cratic citizenship, and self-determination by territorial communities.” Id.  at 15.).
85 S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1975), cert. denied , 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (“Mount Laurel I”); Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158 (1983) (“Mount
Laurel II”).
86 Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government , 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002);
Janice C. Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth:  The Need for Regional
Governments , 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2001); Jared Eigerman, California Coun-
ties:  Second-Rate Localities or Ready-Made Regional Governments? , 26 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 621 (1999).  For a tentative endorsement of Oregon’s land use planning
system, see  Terry D. Morgan, Exclusionary Zoning:  Remedies Under Oregon’s Land
Use Planning Program , 14 ENVTL. L. 779 (1984).
87 See  Briffault, Localism and Regionalism , supra  note 83, at 8.  (“The existing
local governance system contributes to sprawl.”  By linking both the tax rate and the
funds available for local public services to the local tax base” the local government
system adds to the concentration of poverty. Id.  at 12; “Local government land use
decisions, in particular, regularly affect people outside local borders who are unable
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attentiveness to housing issues, but appropriately grounded in
the exigencies of the local situation, to limit or override local
governments’ discretion on housing issues to ensure that the gen-
eral welfare of the region would be served.88
Yet if history is any judge, despite numerous and vigorous dis-
cussions, only a few states will adopt significant structural land
use reforms embracing strong regionalism.89  Rather, for many
reasons—including traditional policy reasons, local governments’
vested interests and citizens’ lack of a regional vision90—most
states for the foreseeable future will continue to delegate sub-
stantial land use authority to local governments, including broad
discretionary authority over key policies and decisions affecting
housing.91  State government elected bodies tend to be sympa-
thetic to local governments because state legislatures are often
dominated by officials representing suburban jurisdictions who
wielded land use authority themselves when they served as local
elected officials.  Continued state attempts to provide financial
incentives for voluntary regional collaboration in which local
governments continue to exercise their traditional land use pow-
ers appear more likely than the adoption of strong regionalism.92
to participate in that decision making process.” Id.  at 21; “The existing localist
structure reflects and reinforces economic and social inequalities.” Id.  at 25.)
88 The region around Portland, Oregon, is an exception.  It has an authoritative
regional government, but the effects on housing, especially affordable housing, are
widely disputed.  No other region has adopted its model.
89 Briffault, Localism and Regionalism , supra  note 83, at 2 (“Indeed, the resis-
tance to regionalism in quite widespread in most metropolitan areas.”).  The current
wave of regionalism is not the first. See  Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of
American Regional Planning in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM (Bruce Katz ed.,
2000) (reviewing the history of regional planning in the United States and expressing
hopeful skepticism of contemporary regionalism).
90 Briffault, Localism and Regionalism , supra  note 83, at 29–30 (“[T]he fate of
regionalism will turn on whether regionalists will be able to persuade people that
their interests are sufficiently tied in with those of the residents or other communi-
ties within the region.”).
91 Even the American Planning Association’s ambitious “Growing Smart” pro-
gram only promotes regional planning; the APA shrank from proposing “super-
agencies or governmental restructuring.” See  Stuart Meck, The American Planning
Association’s Growing Smart Project:  An Overview for Attorneys , SG021 ALI-ABA
559 (2001). See also AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGIS-
LATIVE GUIDEBOOK, ch. 6 (Regional Planning) (2002).
92 See , e.g. , Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism Final Report , available at  http:/
/www.regionalism.org/pdf/scorfinalreportsummit02feb02.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).  Despite the report’s strong advocacy for regionalism, it does not recommend
any significant structural changes in power allocation between local governments
and the state.
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Existing laws, with a few exceptions, do not require local gov-
ernments to consider impacts in their decision making, but rather
require other conduct, such as planning.  Also, no other constitu-
tional, statutory or common law requires local governments to
regularly consider the housing impacts of their actions.93  Moreo-
ver, structural solutions, such as the establishment of strong re-
gionalism, appear to be beyond the current horizon.  So the
obstacles that local governments regularly place in the way of
achieving the National Housing Act’s goal of “a decent home
and suitable living environment for every American family” will
remain unless a new regulatory strategy is adopted.94  The next
Part explores HIA requirements as a potential regulatory strat-
egy to integrate housing concerns in the full range of local gov-
ernments’ land use policy-making and decisions.
II
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR APPLYING AN IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENT TO HOUSING
State governments have the authority to regulate local govern-
ments’ exercise of discretion in land use decisions that affect
93 The state constitutional doctrines of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania
may be exceptions.  In some cases, a state’s environmental quality act may require
local governments to study whether housing impacts, usually considered as “socio-
economic” impacts, may be severe enough to cause a significant environmental im-
pact, such as traffic congestion and air pollution from commuting workers. See , e.g. ,
Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 110 Cal. Rptr.
2d 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (applying California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) and holding if even an agency finds such housing impacts, CEQA only
requires it to warn the neighboring jurisdictions of potential housing impacts).
94 Unfortunately, because state-level “smart growth,” growth management, and
other growth control efforts are often insensitive to housing concerns—especially
affordability—to the degree these reforms are adopted, they may pose serious addi-
tional threats to workers and others with unmet housing needs.  A recent state-by-
state review of the American Planning Association’s report on the results of its na-
tional “Growing Smart” campaign revealed that very few of the “successes” touted
by the APA include any measures that will directly support affordable housing, see
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, PLANNING FOR SMART GROWTH:  2002 STATE
OF STATES (2002), available at  www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/ states2002.pdf.
The only mandatory measure was California’s Senate Bill 211 which extended the
existence of San Francisco’s redevelopment agency on the condition that it spend
more money on low-income housing.  Copy of review on file with author. See also
Anthony Downs, Growth Management, Smart Growth, and Affordable Housing ,
keynote speech for Brookings Institution, May 29, 2003, at  http://
www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/downs/20030529_downs.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2004) (regarding Smart Growth, “[p]romoting more affordable housing can be a
goal, but usually is not”).
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housing.  Arguably, states have a duty to ensure that local gov-
ernments exercise this delegated power for the general welfare,
including the promotion of state housing goals.95  However, as
discussed in Part I, supra , states face a formidable challenge in
fashioning a regulatory regime that simultaneously constrains lo-
cal governments’ discretion effectively to serve the states’ hous-
ing goals and fits within the limits of our traditions of localism.
Faced with this regulatory challenge, states should consider
new regulatory regimes that might achieve their objective while
respecting their limitations.  One potentially promising regula-
tory strategy is the impact assessment requirement.  First
adopted by NEPA as the environmental impact statement, the
regulatory strategy was replicated in many states as SEPAs.  It
has also been used or proposed to focus attention on other types
of impacts, including housing.96  A few federal, state, and local
policies97 already incorporate some form of HIA component.
95 Professor Briffault’s extensive study of localism led him to urge scholars to seek
solutions at the state level.  “New legal doctrines and governmental structures are
needed to . . . strengthen the states’ role in overseeing local power and overriding
parochial actions. . . .” Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45, at 6.
96 See SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRON-MENTAL
IMPACT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 7 (1984) [hereinafter MAKING BU-
REAUCRACIES THINK] (“Variants of the [environmental impact statement] program
have spread to several policy fields, and have been proposed for many others, in-
cluding, for example, economic impact statements, arms control statements, family
statements, urban and community statements, human rights statements, and demo-
graphic statements.”). Id . at 295 and accompanying footnotes.  Professor Michael
Herz discusses a “human impact statement” that could include consideration of the
“allocation of scarce public resources to public housing” as part of a “thought exper-
iment.”  Michael Herz, Parallel Universes:  NEPA Lessons for the New Property , 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1724 (1993) [hereinafter, Herz, Parallel Universes]. See also
FRANK VANCLAY & DANIEL BRONSTEIN, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (1995), and the website of the International Association for Impact
Assessment, an organization promoting the use of impact assessment strategies, at
www.iaia.org. (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
97 In addition to Florida’s regional impact requirement and housing impact fee
ordinances, discussed supra  notes 72-76 and accompanying text, a few federal and
state policies already incorporate a housing impact dimension.  (1) The federally-
mandated “Consolidated Plan” requires that state and local governments eligible for
certain block grant funds (such as Community Development Block Grant, Home
Investment Partnership Program, McKinney or Emergency Shelter Grant, and
Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS) conduct an analysis of “impedi-
ments to fair housing choice,” which entails consideration of how a jurisdiction’s
zoning ordinances and land use decisions might impact the housing opportunities of
classes protected by the federal Fair Housing Act. See OFFICE OF FAIR HOUS. &
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV’T, FAIR HOUS. PLAN-
NING GUIDE, 1 & 2 (1996).  For a description and analysis of two regional housing
choice plans that resulted in part from the required “analysis of impediments,” see
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There are signs of additional interest in this strategy.98  Could a
state HIA requirement on local governments modeled on a
SEPA be a solution to the states’ regulatory problems?
Deborah Kenn, Housing Choice Case Studies:  The Twin Cities Region in Minnesota
and City of Rochester/Monroe County, New York , 11 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. &
CMTY. DEV. L. 303 (2002).  (2) Since 1970, California has required municipalities to
prepare five year comprehensive plans concerning the locality’s exercise of land use
authority delegated to it by the state.  One required element of such a comprehen-
sive plan is the “housing element,” which must include an identification and analysis
of potential and actual governmental and non-governmental constraints on housing.
Constraints include restrictive planning and zoning policies.  Localities are required
to remove such constraints where “feasible and legally possible.” CAL. GOVT. CODE
§§ 65583(a)(4)–(5) (1999).
98 The concept proposed in this Article coincides with a suggestion made almost a
decade ago in Timothy Choppin, Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regula-
tion Barrier:  Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs , 82 GEO. L. J.
2039, 2073 (1994) (“In other operations of government, regulations are reviewed for
adverse impacts on important governmental objectives, such as environmental im-
pacts and budgeting processes.  Development regulations should receive the same
scrutiny.”).  Following are brief references to one federal-level example and two
state-level examples of efforts to incorporate a version of an HIA requirement into
government decision making.  (1) Since 1998, the National Association of Home
Builders has been pushing a bill in Congress to require federal agencies to analyze
the potential impacts on housing affordability as part of its rule-making process.  A
bill incorporating this approach has passed the U.S. House of Representatives twice,
most recently in H.R. 3899.  It has most recently been reintroduced to the first ses-
sion of the 108 Congress as HR 730.  The Millennial Housing Commission’s report
endorsed this bill as one of its supporting recommendations. See  MHC Report,
supra  note 20, at 75.  (2) In California, a recent unsuccessful bill, S.B. 439, 2001-02
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), would have added a “human impact” assessment requirement
to the CEQA, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178 (West 2001).  The “human im-
pact” section of an EIS would contain, among other things, an assessment of impacts
that any covered project would have on homeownership in determining whether a
proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment.  (3) In 2000, at
least three lawsuits in California have attempted to get courts to order municipalities
to incorporate “housing impact analysis” into EISs required by the CEQA.  (Briefs
on file with author).  One has been decided by an appellate court, one settled after a
trial court decision, and one is currently being decided by an appellate court.  The
only decided appellate case of this group, Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa
County Bd. of Supervisors , 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), both opens
and closes a door for “housing impact analysis” lawsuits under CEQA.  On the one
hand, the call announces standards for agencies to determine when they must pre-
pare housing impact analyses and discusses adequacy standards for such housing
impact analyses.  On the other hand, it holds that even if an agency is required to
perform such an analysis and finds that a project’s housing impacts would cause
significant environmental impacts, CEQA’s duty to mitigate impacts whenever feasi-
bility does not apply.  Rather, a city need only “warn” a nearby locality of the likely
housing impacts.  The court found that an adequate housing impact analysis consti-
tutes a sufficient warning to meet CEQA’s requirements.
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A. The Attraction of a Housing Impact Assessment Strategy
An HIA strategy initially appears attractive for several rea-
sons.  First, certain critical contemporary housing problems, spe-
cifically increasing the supply and affordability of housing and
siting additional housing,99 present many of the same regulatory
problems as the potential degradation of the environment by
government decisions before NEPA was enacted.  Like the envi-
ronment, primary housing decisions are made by units of govern-
ment (especially local governments) exercising broad discretion
delegated to them by other governmental entities.  The state
needs to control the exercise of broad discretion delegated to
agencies (local governments) in a manner that displaces neither
the proper scope of local control nor the proper role of the mar-
ket in housing production, but serves the state’s housing
policy.100
Housing issues are often ignored by local decision-makers, and
in some cases, are treated with hostility.  There is a need for an
integrative regulatory regime to promote the overall policy goal
(in the case of housing, the Housing Act of 1949, or a state’s ar-
ticulated housing goal).  Yet the complexity of the policy area
makes comprehensive substantive regulation impossible.101
Often, the prospective beneficiaries of thoughtful housing poli-
cies are often not involved in decisions affecting them.  Decisions
harming housing are often practically irreversible.102  And, im-
portantly, when local governments attend to housing issues, they
can  often adjust their policies to serve both  housing and other
policy goals.103
Second, an impact assessment strategy could be effective be-
99 This Article will focus attention on these components of our housing problems
both because they have been identified as being critical by numerous authoritative
sources (e.g., Bipartisan Millennial Housing Commission) and because they are the
specific housing problems over which local governments have substantial control.
Other housing problems such as substandard housing, may be more amenable to
other regulatory approaches.
100 See supra  notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
101 Because of the complexity of housing production, location and financing,
states are not competent to enact comprehensive traditional substantive regulation
to direct local governments in making policies and decisions affecting housing.
Housing problems are too diverse for states to dictate what types and amounts of
housing should be produced in what locations and the complexity of housing pro-
duction processes preclude state governments from dictating how housing should be
produced.
102 See supra  note 12.
103 See supra  notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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cause housing policy and decisions are amenable to rigorous
analysis that can produce valuable information for decision-mak-
ers and other participants.104  If an impact assessment strategy is
adopted, different types of projects and housing impacts will re-
quire different types of impact analysis, just as environmental im-
pact analyses vary by what type of decision is at issue and what
types of environmental impacts are being considered.105
Many methodologies for generating useful HIAs are already
available.  For example, analysts regularly offer projections of re-
gional and subregional housing trends correlated to employment,
transportation, and other important policy variables.106  These
104 Professor Taylor considered this a precondition for the value of an impact as-
sessment strategy. See MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK, supra  note 96 at 307–08.
Taylor does not require that the field be fully mature and without conflict.  Rather, it
is enough that the field be developed enough to provide useful information now and
be capable of further enhancement.  On this criterion, the current art and science of
housing policy analysis discussed in the accompanying text meets Taylor’s threshold
requirement. See also  Dinah Bear, The National Environmental Policy Act:  Its Ori-
gins and Evolutions , 10 FALL NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 3 (1995) (noting that a possi-
ble pre-requirement for CEQA was the scientific and other work available in 1969
showing the importance of environment, threats posed to it and risks if threats were
unaddressed).  For a critical analysis of the potential for comprehensive environ-
mental analysis in contemporary NEPA practice, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, To-
ward a Smarter NEPA:  Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental
Performance , 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA].
105 Each of the three types of adverse impacts identified in the model HIA in Part
III, infra , can be fruitfully investigated using a combination of the analytic models
that planners already employ to produce projections.
106 See , e.g. , publications available from the Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments at  http://www.abag.ca.gov/abag/overview/datacenter/databod.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2004).  Subregional projections are also at  http://www.abag.ca.gov/
planning/subregional/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).  Examples of this analysis can be
found in Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors , 110 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing EIR which analyzed potential housing
demand from development of industrial area around county airport and finding that
in certain circumstances, an EIR must:
at a minimum, identify the number and type of housing units that persons
working within the Project area can be anticipated to require, and indentify
the probable location of these units.  The [EIR] also should consider
whether the identified communities have sufficient housing units and suffi-
cient services to accommodate the anticipated increase in population.
It also must explain what action needs to be taken to provide those units or services
if they are not likely to be available. Id.  at 599); County of Santa Cruz v. City of San
Jose, 2003 WL 1566913 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.) (discussing EIR which “estimated the
total demand for housing to serve the project’s employees, assessed existing and
planned housing stock in the region in an effort to forecast where employees might
reside, and included data on the number of employees expected to commute from
each area”). Id.  at *21.
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analytical methods have largely been developed in states with
mandatory local planning that includes a housing element, e.g.,
California, Oregon and Washington.  Such information can en-
rich decision-makers’ deliberation about housing policy by in-
creasing their understanding of how a particular city fits into a
regional housing, employment and transportation context.107
Land supply monitoring systems, which aim to ensure an ade-
quate supply of buildable land for future needs, have also been
developed.108  Using these methodologies, local officials can bet-
ter appreciate the housing impacts of their zoning policies.
The capacity of a given area of land for housing production can
be determined objectively by a consideration of the zoning, den-
sity, availability of infrastructure and other facts.  Similarly, the
change in potential yield can be calculated by considering the ef-
fect of any change of these factors.  In addition, the probable
housing impacts of transportation and infrastructure develop-
ment can be identified and measured.  Also the effects and costs
of various housing policies on housing demand and supply have
been studied.109  Currently available analyses enable planners to
present local leadership with an array of options with relatively
concrete predictions of the consequences on housing based upon
identified working assumptions.  Models for forecasting housing
needs generated by non-residential, job-generating developments
have been in use in Florida, in other states regulating develop-
ments with regional impacts, and by numerous local governments
that have adopted and administered “housing impact” or “com-
mercial linkage” fee programs.110  These programs employ a
housing impact analysis to set mitigation fees.111
107 For a critical view of forecasting, see Michael Dardia & Laura Mameesh,
Searching for a Crystal Ball:  Forecasts and Long-range Planning , CAL. POL’Y REV.,
Sept. 2001, available at  http://www.sphereinstitute.org.
108 See , AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE
GUIDEBOOK, ch. 7 (Local Planning) (2002).  Many state codes require local govern-
ments to monitor the amount of land suitable for development. See CAL. GOVT.
CODE § 65583(a)(3) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(3)(a) (2001); WASH. REV.
CODE § 36.70A.215(1)(a) (2000). See also ASSOCIATION OF BAY AREA GOVERN-
MENTS, SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY SURVEY:  A
DATA BASE INVENTORY OF DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL (1994).
109 See , e.g. , the resources available at the American Planning Association web-
site, at  www.planning.org.
110 See supra  notes 64-65; see also  William W. Merrill, III & Robert K. Lincoln,
The Missing Link:  Legal Issues and Implementation Strategies for Affordable Hous-
ing Linkage Fees and Fair Share Regulations , 22 STETSON L. REV. 469 (1993).
111 See  Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage:  Regulating Development Impact on
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While some forms of housing impact analysis would be com-
plex and controversial,112 an HIA requirement would be an in-
centive for new methodologies to be developed or further
refined, just as occurred in the environmental field with the ad-
vent of the environmental impact statement requirement.  Even-
tually, it is possible that a “level of housing service” analysis
could be devised analogous to models currently used for traffic,
schools or other infrastructure analysis.113  Overall, the field of
housing policy and analysis is sufficiently developed to provide
meaningful analysis of the potential housing impacts of a wide
range of local governments’ land use decisions and policy-
making.
Third, an impact assessment strategy has the potential for
meeting the states’ regulatory goal:  integrating housing concerns
into local governments’ land use policy and decision making.  In
principle, if local governments were required to consider the
housing impacts of their decisions, this would help ensure that
Housing Costs , 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1991) (advocating housing linkage as a
“principled mechanism for offsetting the housing burden imposed on communities
by nonresidential development if local governments apply formulas that carefully
calculate the impact nonresidential development projects will have on community
housing requirements”).
112 In some cases, a policy, program, or project may cause multiple positive and
negative effects, indirect effects, and feedback loops.  It is possible that no reliable
methodology may be available to analyze the impacts of some proposed develop-
ments on certain types of housing.  For example, the impacts of a development of a
small retail store on housing for persons with disabilities or homeless persons might
be indeterminate.  Of course, there would be conflicts in various analyses about the
effects of a particular supply on housing prices, application of the “filtration hypoth-
esis,” and other issues, just as there are intense methodological conflicts in environ-
mental analysis.  Methodological conflicts should not be submerged.  Rather,
analysts should be required to state their assumptions clearly and distinguish in their
findings between what is known and what is uncertain.  If analysis of a specific class
of projects or type of housing impact were widely deemed regularly indeterminate
or speculative, such projects and/or impacts could be specifically exempted from
analysis.  For example, CEQA regulations provide categorical exclusions for certain
types of projects for this reason. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21084(a) (West 1992).
113 Such an analysis could consider the housing stock available (type, numbers,
condition, affordability and availability/vacancy rates) and potential future housing
stock (based upon current zoning, planning codes, etc.).  This objective benchmark
could then be used for determining the potential significance of a proposal as well as
for future planning and, if a jurisdiction were interested, the development of sub-
stantive elements of an HIA, such as a mitigation requirement.  For example, if a
city is proposing to do something that would bring its level of housing service below
“x,” then it must mitigate those effects.  Such a “level of housing service” analysis
could be extended to include a measure of economic and racial stratification and/or
limited access due to discrimination.
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housing interests would consistently come to their attention.114
Fourth, such impact analysis could benefit housing in several
ways.  The benefits to housing could accrue by preventing avoid-
able harms to housing that would have occurred without housing
impact consideration, e.g., by preventing the adoption of burden-
some regulation.115  Housing could benefit by the possibilities re-
vealed through the HIA, which would have been unknown or
overlooked without the analysis, e.g., promoting mixed uses
where the housing impacts of a commercial development are rec-
ognized.116  HIA could lead to housing development being more
often favored when tradeoffs between housing and other local
needs are required, e.g., in zoning more land for residential uses
compared to commercial uses.  When HIAs reveal regular pat-
terns of relationships between local governments’ decisions and
effects on housing, the requirements could promote the adoption
of local pro-housing policies and practices, e.g., higher density
zoning, density bonus zoning or policies favoring the construc-
tion of secondary units.  Ultimately, the requirements could pro-
mote broader future changes, such as more cooperation between
local jurisdictions that may lead to some form of regionalism.
Finally, such a regulatory strategy could work within the limits
of our enduring localism.  It would respect local governments’
expertise in local matters and balance competing local interests
by not taking away or overriding local governments’ land use au-
thority.  It would not overreach the state’s competency in regu-
lating local governments’ exercise of discretion in land use
matters.  Yet it would enlist local governments in the service of
state housing policy.  These potentials suggest further considera-
tion of an HIA strategy is merited.
114 See infra , Part IV for analysis about how effectively a housing impact analysis
requirement would perform this integration function in two regulatory paradigms.
115 See , Timothy Choppin, Note, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation
Barrier:  Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs , 82 GEO. L.J. 2039
(1994) (supporting revision of state delegation of land use authority to local govern-
ments to reduce cost of housing for “moderate income households,” recognizing also
that lower-income households need subsidies).  The NAHB “housing impact state-
ment” federal proposal, supra , note 98, may be intended to reduce federal regula-
tions that might increase housing costs.
116 Local governments’ land use decision making proceeds serially and interac-
tively with the private sector’s initiation of particular land development proposals.
While local governments initially zone and plan for certain uses, the likelihood of
actual housing or other development depends upon initiatives from the private sec-
tor.  When private sector projects take shape this can open up opportunities that
were not foreseen during local governments’ planning and zoning.
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B. Impact Assessment Requirements:  A Deceptively Simple
Regulatory Device
Serious consideration of the application of impact assessment
strategy as a solution to state governments’ regulatory challenge
immediately reveals the complexity of this apparently simple reg-
ulatory strategy.  There are two related issues.  First, scholars do
not agree on how to conceptualize impact assessment require-
ments.  Second, the effectiveness of impact assessment require-
ments is heavily contested.
The complexity of this regulatory strategy can be unpacked in
three steps.  Impact assessment requirements are typically proce-
dural duties which mandate the production, dissemination and
consideration of information but do not require a specific sub-
stantive outcome.  Yet the production and dissemination of infor-
mation potentially implicate changes in government decision
making and political dynamics.117  The requirements for dissemi-
nation of the information, public hearings, and responses to com-
ments received open up the possibility of new levels and kinds of
public participation in decision making and public accountability
about these decisions.  In addition, if judicial review is part of the
scheme, courts’ interpretation and application of impact assess-
ment requirements add another dimension to how these require-
ments will modify the exercise of local governments’
discretionary authority.  The prospect of litigation and actual
lawsuits influence both local governments’ and private actors’
calculations concerning the information produced pursuant to
the requirements and the decisions that follow.  Thus, an appar-
ently simple and non-demanding procedural mandate that a local
government produce and consider certain information relating to
its decision making implicates a broad range of actors potentially
influencing these decisions and opens up to an uncertain degree
117 See  Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, at 904–05 (describ-
ing NEPA supporters’ views that:
[T]his simple information disclosure mandate forces agency managers to
identify and confront the environmental consequences of their actions,
about which they otherwise would remain ignorant.  It also opens govern-
ment decisions to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny, with conse-
quent political implications that decisionmakers ignore only at their
peril. . . . that this combustible blend of information, transparency, and
political accountability creates powerful pressures on agency deci-
sionmakers to avoid the most environmentally damaging courses of action,
and to mitigate environmental harms when it is cost effective to do so.
(footnotes omitted).
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how much current practices and ways of doing business will be
affected by the requirement.
Impact assessment requirements, such as the National Envi-
ronmental Protection Act’s environmental impact statement
(EIS) requirement, have been plausibly conceptualized within at
least five regulatory models.118  The “comprehensive rational
model” views the impact assessment requirement as a means to
force bureaucracy to synoptically consider all the potential con-
sequences of a contemplated action before making a decision.119
The “economics of information model” sees the device as a
means of internalizing an externality:  the regulation mandates
the production of information useful for rational decision making
by individual actors.  This information might not have been oth-
erwise produced because the cost of producing the information
would have been greater than the benefits to any particular
actor.120
The “civic republican” or direct democracy model focuses on
the requirement’s potential to evoke broad-based citizen partici-
118 The National Environmental Protection Act’s EIS was the first example of an
impact assessment requirement and has been studied intensively.  Karkkainen iden-
tifies the comprehensive rational model, a Jeffersonian or “populist” impulse model,
and a pluralist or interest group representation model. Id.  at 912-16  Numerous
models are discernable in the collection of NEPA evaluation studies that Professor
Daniel R. Mandelker collects in his text. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND
LITIGATION (Ch. 11, Evaluation:  The Effect of NEPA on Federal Agencies) (2002)
[hereinafter MANDELKER, NEPA LAW]. See  Lorna Jorgensen, Note, The Move To-
ward Participatory Democracy in Public Land Management Under NEPA:  Is It Be-
ing Thwarted by the ESA? , 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 311 (2000);
Reclaiming NEPA’s Potential:  Can Collaborative Processes Improve Environmental
Decision Making?  (U. of Mont. Center for the Rocky Mt. West & U. of Wyo. Inst.
for Envtl. & Nat. Res., 2000).  Others have interpreted NEPA as providing the pro-
cedural framework for negotiated rulemaking.
119 Professor Karkkainen adopts the view that the comprehensive rational model
is the best way to understand NEPA, and subjects it to intense criticism on this basis.
Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, at 925–33.
120 See , e.g. , Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Stand-
ing:  Akins and Beyond,  147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618 (1999).  In Professor Sunstein’s
view, whether informational regulation is superior as a policy instrument to tradi-
tional regulatory approaches or unregulated economic markets depends upon the
details.  Informational strategies can be inferior to conventional regulatory strategies
in two important ways:  costs may outweigh benefits to be gained from disclosure,
and information disclosure is sometimes ineffectual or even counterproductive.  The
ideal setting is when the problem involves a market failure in the provision of infor-
mation, useful information can be produced and disseminated cheaply, the informa-
tion is understandable to the target audiences, and the target audiences can
effectively act upon the information.
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pation in policy-making.121  The “interest group representation
model” expects the requirement to enable interest groups repre-
senting previously inadequately represented interests to advance
their cause by playing a stronger role in pluralist interest group
politics.122  Finally, the “reflexive law model” views the require-
ment as a mechanism to change the informal rules (or norms) by
which decisions are made.123
Each theory includes the idea that the requirement in some
way integrates  a previously ignored policy concern into the deci-
sions and policy that affect the policy goal, and hopes for positive
change in the outcomes for those goals via some mecha-
nism(s).124  The models disagree as to the normative justification
for the requirement, when its application is appropriate, and the
mechanism(s) by which it will serve the policy goal.125
In addition to being conceptually contested, not surprisingly,
the effectiveness of impact assessment requirements is hotly de-
bated.  The indirectness of the requirement’s expected effect—its
procedural character and lack of a mandated substantive out-
come—is one source of conflict.126  These disputes make empiri-
121 See , e.g. , Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National
Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation , 26 ENVTL. L. 53 (1996).
122 See , e.g. , JOHN FELLEMAN, DEEP INFORMATION: THE ROLE OF INFORMA-TION
POLICY IN ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro, Adminis-
trative Law After the Counter-Reformation:  Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Govern-
ment , 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law , 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1759 (1975).
123 The works of other jurisprudence scholars such as Gunther Teubner, Substan-
tive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law , 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983),
scholars Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein, along with Philippe Nonet and Philip
Selzick, locate the EIS process and impact assessment strategy in the context of
“reflexive law” strategies. See , e.g. , Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law , 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995); Eric Bregman and Arthur Jacobson, Environmental
Performance Review:  Self-Regulation in Environmental Law , 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
465 (1994); Michael Herz, Parallel Universes:  NEPA Lessons for the New Property ,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1689-93 (1993).
124 See , e.g. , Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA:  Future Significance of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act , 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 204 (1998).
125 For example, authors analyzing NEPA as an example of reflexive law argue
that the policy is justified by the failure of the previous administrative framework to
incorporate the value of avoiding damage to the environment, that the imposition of
the requirement is justified when substantive or formal regulatory means are not
available to promote state policy, and that NEPA will achieve its objective by creat-
ing a new form of self-regulation reforming the norms of decision-makers, regulated
entities and regulatory beneficiaries. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK,
supra  note 96, at 307–12 (identifying requisites for NEPA’s effectiveness in his
model).
126 See , e.g. , Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act:
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cal studies measuring effectiveness difficult to design and
inconclusive in their results.
Perhaps the best example of these debates concerns the effec-
tiveness of NEPA’s EIS requirement.127  NEPA’s goal is to pro-
tect the environment.  In particular, in enacting NEPA, Congress
sought to reduce environmental damage caused by its own fed-
eral agencies when they made policies and pursued projects with
significant negative environmental effects.  Instead of imposing
substantive regulatory standards,128 NEPA requires covered
agencies to perform various procedures to identify and consider
potential environmental impacts that Congress hoped would in-
fluence or guide outcomes toward the regulatory goal of environ-
mental protection.129
NEPA proponents claim that the application of EIS has led to
numerous decisions by federal agencies, state agencies and local
governments to protect environmental resources and to mitigate
what would have been worse consequences of the originally pro-
posed development projects.130  Others point to the change EIS
Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny , 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207,
207–09 (1992).
127 Professor Mandelker has collected the most complete set of analyses of
NEPA’s effectiveness in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at Chapter 11.
For a recent summary of the debates and evaluation, see Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, 904-17.
128 National environmental legislation following NEPA, e.g., the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act, imposed substantive regulatory standards.
129 Specifically, in NEPA Congress imposed numerous procedural requirements
and provided for a private right of action to enforce its requirements.  An agency
planning a “major federal action” must consider if such action would have a “signifi-
cant effect” on the environment and prepare an “environmental assessment” (EA)
stating its conclusion and rationale.  If the EA finds a potential significant effect,
NEPA requires the agency to prepare an “environmental impact statement” (EIS),
an analysis detailing how a contemplated action might harm the environment, alter-
natives to the proposal with fewer impacts, and measures that could mitigate the
potential impacts.  If an EA discovers no significant impact, the agency may prepare
a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) and terminate the environmental review
process.  NEPA then requires the agency to disseminate an EA and an EIS (if pre-
pared) to the public and to other interested agencies.  If an EIS is produced, it is
treated as a draft; NEPA requires the agency to consider and to respond to the
comments of the public and other interested agencies formally in a final environ-
mental impact statement (FEIR).  Finally, NEPA empowers certain parties to chal-
lenge in court the agency’s compliance with the statute. See  Herz, Parallel
Universes , supra  note 96, at 1678–79.  For a case comparing a substantive regulatory
regime to NEPA’s procedural requirements, see Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v.
Alexander , 238 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 2000).
130 While none are wholly uncritical, each of the articles and studies cited in
MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at Part III (“Positive Evaluations”), finds
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wrought in the attitudes, culture and practices of the agencies.131
positive effects on federal agencies.  Professor Mandelker’s view is that “NEPA con-
tinues to be a major and critical environmental law.” Id.  at xiii.  After an initially
dour view, Professor Joseph Sax reappraised NEPA in More Than Just a Passing
Fad , 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 804 & n.28 (1986).  He admits he “underesti-
mated the influence of NEPA’s ‘soft law’ elements” and that NEPA’s “legitimating
public participation, and demanding openness in planning and decisionmaking, has
been indispensable to a permanent and powerful increase in environmental action.”
Id.  He further notes:  “the presence of citizen-initiated litigation is a major factor
that keeps public agencies from slackening in their resolve to see that environmental
laws are enforced.” Id.  The value of NEPA to the environmentalist community can
also be gauged by its continuing use of the statute and its insistence on NEPA’s
application in particular circumstances.  There are, of course, numerous instances of
projects stopped or delayed because of NEPA violations. See , e.g. , GEORGE COG-
GINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, § 12.01 (1990).  A NEPA lawsuit forced
the Bureau of Land Management into a system-wide series of environmental impact
statements that changed the nature of livestock grazing regulation; application of
NEPA has indirectly destroyed many property attributes of federal mineral leases;
and the Act has contributed to safeguarding tens of millions of acres as potential
wilderness areas. See id.  at § 12.01 and 12-2. See also  David W. Case, The Law and
Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation , 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (July,
2001) (reviewing economic and legal literature on the issue, finding that many em-
pirical economic analyses support the notion that mandatory information disclosure
strategies can be effective in changing the behavior of regulated entities, including
via market mechanisms).
131 Professor Taylor documents two linked mechanisms he found empirically at
work in his research of two federal agencies:  the “analyst advocate” or analytical
internal mechanism, and the “outside advocate empowerment” or political mecha-
nism.  The analyst advocate is a person working within the decision making body
who uses her professional influence to ensure that significant environmental impacts
are not ignored.  The outside advocate is empowered by her participation rights to
press decision-makers to avoid significant impacts or to mitigate them.  She does this
by speaking at public hearings, contacting the media, and in other ways often relying
on the procedural requirements to pressure decision-makers. TAYLOR, MAKING BU-
REAUCRACIES THINK, supra  note 96.  Another researcher traced a four-phase insti-
tutional evolution from “early interpretative and formal compliance to an integrated
planning and finally a programmatic planning phase” as environmental issues be-
come more and more deeply integrated into an agency’s practices.  A.F. Wichelman,
Administrative Agency Interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969:  A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response , 16 NAT. RES.
J. 263 (1976) (cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118 at 11-12.) See also
Jon C. Cooper, Broad Programmatic, Policy and Planning Assessments Under the
National Environmental Policy Act and Similar Devices:  A Quiet Revolution in an
Approach to Environmental Considerations , 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (1993);
Fairfax & Andrews, Debate Within and Debate Without:  NEPA and the Redefinition
of the “Prudent Man” Rule , 19 NAT. RES. J. 505 (1979) (cited in MANDELKER,
NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-10 n.3); Richard Andrews, NEPA in Practice:
Environmental Policy or Administrative Reform? , 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 50001 (1976)
(cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-13).  Professor Eric Orts
considers NEPA only a partially reflexive law mechanism, and a problematic one.
Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law , 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1275 (1995).  Be-
cause NEPA is limited to administrative law (i.e., the federal bureaucracies) and is
“embedded in a broader substantive legal framework and administrative bureau-
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Several credit the ways in which EIS provides environmental ad-
vocates, interested agencies and the public specific opportunities
to influence decisions.132  These and others argue that the deci-
sion making process has been improved by the procedurally-re-
quired “place” that previously ignored environmental concerns
now occupy.133  Finally, some note the enhanced public visibility
that EIS provides environmental issues and the support for an
“environmental ethic” that this visibility engendered.134
While the prevailing view appears to be that NEPA has been
and continues to be an important component of environmental
protection, there are critics and skeptics.135  Professor Michael
Herz summarizes some of the major criticisms:  “Pure
proceduralism is . . . a costly and pointless waste of time because
the ultimate decision remains unconstrained” both because of
the lack of any substantive standard or other exogenous restric-
cracy,” he doubts its “efficacy in terms of changing the thinking in social systems
other than law. . . .” Id.  at 1275.  Yet, while remaining non-committal, even he
thinks “[a]lthough NEPA has juridifying tendencies, it may genuinely accomplish its
goal of internalizing environmental considerations in agency decisionmaking.” Id.
at 1340 n.200.
132 See  40 C.F.R § 1503.1 (1993) (NEPA regulations require agencies to disclose
draft environmental impact statements, to invite comments from the public, and to
“affirmatively solicit . . . comments from those persons or organizations who may be
interested or affected.”); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, An-
ticipated and Unanticipated , 20 ENVTL. L. 681 (1990) (cited in MANDELKER, NEPA
LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-9); Stark Ackerman, The Effects of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making , 20 ENVTL. L. 703 (1990)
(cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-17); Michael Blumm &
Steve Brown, Pluralism and the Environment:  The Role of Comment Agencies in
NEPA Litigation , 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277 (1990); Richard A. Lirof, NEPA—
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going, 46 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 154
(1980) (cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-7). See also  Rich-
ard Andrews, NEPA in Practice:  Environmental Policy or Administrative Reform? ,
6 ENVTL. L. REP. 50001 (1976) (cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118,
at 11-13).
133 See  Lirof, supra  note 132; Culhane, supra  note 132; Stanley Millan, Wanted:
NEPA, Dead or Alive, Reward:  Our Global Environment  [Analysis & Perspective],
22 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 2081, 2081-82 (Dec. 21, 1991).
134 See  Cahn, The Impact of NEPA on Public Perception of Environmental Issues ,
6 ENVTL. L. REP. 50010 (1976) (cited in MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118,
at 11-8, n.8).
135 After its enactment some environmentalists expressed disappointment with
NEPA’s enforcement mechanism, the EIS.  While this criticism has strongly influ-
enced many academics, much of the initial criticism was impressionistic and nar-
rowly focused.  Later, more comprehensive studies of NEPA’s effects were
conducted and found overall positive results. See MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra
note 118, § 11.01 at 11-2 and § 11.04[2]–11.04[3]. See also  Professor Karkkainen’s
criticisms, Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, at 925-33.
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tion and because of the lack of judicial enforcement of a substan-
tive standard.136  Governments and developers also roundly
criticize EIS for being a costly, unwieldy, open-ended burden
that provides ample opportunities for what critics say amounts to
“extortion” by environmentalist advocates.137  Furthermore,
many criticize possible unintended consequences of the EIS re-
quirement, including that some developers may not pursue meri-
torious projects for fear of running the EIS gauntlet.138
After thirty years, debate still continues along several dimen-
sions about whether or not the federal and state versions of EIS
actually benefit the environment and, if so, how.  One respected
scholar who published an early influential critique of NEPA, Pro-
fessor Sax, is now on record as having changed his mind in favor
of NEPA’s value and importance.139  The actual outcomes of
NEPA’s EIS for environmental values have generated volumi-
nous research and commentary.140  This Article will not attempt
to resolve these debates.
In reviewing the debates and analyses of EIS’s effectiveness, it
appears that there are six parameters that collectively determine
how effective, if at all, an impact assessment requirement will be.
They are:  (1) the conceptual framework (discussed, supra) and
any conditions it implies;141 (2) the policy area;142 (3) the institu-
tional context in which the requirement is added;143 (4) the de-
136 Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at 1693–94.
137 Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 118, at 903 (referring to this
dynamic as a “penalty default”); Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at 1720
(identifying NEPA’s numerous unintended consequences, including that it “creates
opportunities for strategic behavior.”).
138 Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at 1719.
139 As a part of the University of Illinois Law Review’s 2000 Symposium, Innova-
tions in Environmental Policy, Joseph Sax wrote to Professor Rodgers:  “NEPA . . .
has become the crucial tool for putting [the] environment on everyone’s agenda.”
William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmen-
tal Law:  “The Whats,” 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, n.19 (2001). See also supra  note 130.
140 See also  studies cited in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 449–51 (2000); MANDELKER, NEPA LAW,
supra  note 118, at §§ 11-1–11-19.
141 For example, the civic democracy view would imply the need for broad and
sustained civic participation to be effective.
142 Not all policy areas are amenable to impact assessment requirements.  For ex-
ample, Taylor notes that if useful impact analysis is not possible, then the policy area
cannot benefit. See supra  note 104; MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK, supra  note
96.
143 Several studies cited by David W. Case, supra  note 130, counsel critical analy-
sis of situations when information regulation is likely to be effective, including Wil-
liam M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:  Disclosure Laws and American
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sign of the requirement;144 (5) the legal context in which the
requirement is added;145 and, (6) the judicial review and enforce-
Health Care , 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1801-25 (1999) (discussing regulatory con-
texts within which disclosure laws are likely to have the greatest influence and pro-
mote meaningful change); Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational
Regulation of Environmental Risks , 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 156 (1998) (asserting
that “more careful systematic thinking about the legal and economic nature of [in-
formational regulation] will yield a better prediction about when this approach is
likely to work efficiently and effectively and when it will not.”); Tom Tietenberg,
Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control , 11 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 587, 600
(1998) (listing some of the “determinants of successful disclosure strategies” that
research to date has identified).  Professor Herz notes that “NEPA was enacted
against a background with virtually no substantive environmental regulation. . . .
NEPA procedures now apply to highly regulated agency decisions. . . . It is therefore
an oversimplification to say that NEPA operates independent of and in place of
substantive standards.”  Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at 1682–83.  The use
of impact analysis to reform the decision making of large, specialized federal bu-
reaucracies will differ from their effectiveness to change how smaller, general pur-
pose local governments act.  The role of an agency specifically charged with assisting
the implementation of the requirement (e.g., CEQA for NEPA and the Office of
Planning and Research for CEQA) may be important.  The role of co-equal agencies
may also be important, e.g., other federal agencies in the case of NEPA and adjacent
local governments in the case of a housing impact requirement imposed on local
governments. See  Michael Blumm & Steve Brown, Pluralism and the Environment:
The Role of Comment Agencies in NEPA Litigation , 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 277
(1990).
144 Numerous design issues could be relevant, including the range of decisions
subject to the requirement, whether the requirement includes a substantive provi-
sion or only procedural duties, and the inclusion of a private right of action.  As
states which adopted “little NEPAs” have shown, states can create a variety of de-
signs of impact assessment requirements.  Indeed, the vast literature criticizing
NEPA and the little NEPAs could be a treasure trove of ideas for designing a better
impact assessment procedure. See , e.g. , David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defin-
ing Sustainable Development:  NEPA Reconsidered , 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1998)
(recommending that CEQA amend its regulations to require externality valuation
and the posting of security for all NEPA decisions in order to create accountability
for accuracy in impact assessments).  Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra
note 104, at 903 (recommending post-decision monitoring, centralized adaptive miti-
gation, and the adoption of an environmental management systems-oriented ap-
proach). See generally MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at § 11.02.
145 This parameter refers to existing legal provisions that might interact with or
complement the impact assessment requirement.  Impact assessment requirements
are not “exclusive” regulatory regimes.  Their effectiveness does not depend upon
their being the only or dominant regulatory regime in operation.  Rather, impact
assessment requirements are likely to be more effective when combined with other
types of regulation such as formal rights and substantive regulation, provided that
the other types of regulation are themselves justifiable and well-designed.  For ex-
ample, in the housing context, the existence of other state housing statutes (e.g.,
comprehensive planning requirements) or fair housing law might affect the effec-
tiveness of the impact assessment requirement because information produced by the
impact assessment requirement might trigger enforcement of these complementary
laws.  The increased effectiveness results from the fact that investigation required by
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ment.146  Each of these elements will directly partially determine
whether or not the requirement will be effective.  In addition,
each of the six elements will also interact with the other parame-
ters to affect results.
Impact assessment requirements are deceptively simple but
conceptually complex in practice.  The attraction of impact as-
sessment requirements is a form of regulation that can lead to
broad, comprehensive reform with minimal regulatory intrusion.
The primary criticism is that they do not work.147  Given the pre-
ceding analysis, there can be no a priori  conceptual answer for
the value of any particular application of an impact assessment
impact assessment mechanisms and improvements of decision making caused by
their required procedures can result in the “sunshine” necessary to trigger enforce-
ment of various other formal substantive laws.  In the case of environmental law,
NEPA complements numerous traditional substantive regulatory programs adopted
after NEPA, for example, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. See , e.g. ,
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989) (noting the
linkage between enforcement of NEPA and other regulation).  Professor Herz dis-
cusses how the federal government’s adoption of substantive environmental protec-
tion (such as the Clean Water Act) had two opposite effects on NEPA’s
independence from substantive standards.  On the one hand, despite proof of meet-
ing substantive standards, courts still required the EIS process, i.e., the standards do
not “preempt” NEPA.  On the other hand, “[i]n practice, the EIS process is tied to
the application of those standards . . . . Thus, NEPA not only helps implement stan-
dards but also supplements them.” See  Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at
1682-83.  For example, the information identified in an EIS may reveal a likely viola-
tion of the Clean Water Act.  It is common for NEPA claims to be closely paired
with these and other complementary substantive-type environmental laws.  As Pro-
fessor Stewart has opined: “While reflexive law measures and other information-
based approaches can make a contribution, they are no substitute for legal controls
on conduct, backed up by effective government enforcement and sanctions.”  Rich-
ard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? , 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 22 (2001).
146 This parameter refers to the availability of a private right of action, standing
requirements, standards of review, burdens of proof, and remedies that will affect
how courts interpret and apply the requirement.  Professor Mandelker notes the
important role of judicial enforcement as “a critical component of NEPA’s imple-
mentation.” MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at 11-13.  Courts regularly
enforce the formal procedural rules which ground the information and participation
rights of participants in the processes, regulated entities and the regulatory benefi-
ciaries.  Participants use their information and participation rights to shape policies
and decisions.  They use their legal right to enforce the procedural rules to claim and
to retain their information and participation rights.  At the same time, threats of
litigation and filing of lawsuits can be an indirect way of pressing other parties to
adopt their preferred decisions and policies.
147 Regarding NEPA, see MENDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at §§ 11.1-
11.2; Herz, Parallel Universes , supra  note 96, at 1699 (“Environmentalists have ar-
gued that NEPA is doomed to irrelevance because real environmental protection
can only come from direct substantive limits.”).
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requirement in the abstract.  An evaluation of a particular propo-
sal considering the specified parameters may provide a persua-
sive case for the adoption of an impact assessment requirement.
Therefore, to consider the value of possible HIA requirements,
Part III will briefly sketch a specific model and then Part IV will
analyze it under two promising conceptual models.
III
A SKETCH OF A HOUSING IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REGIME
This Part will offer a brief sketch of a basic  HIA regime for
purposes of discussion and analysis.  This HIA regime is designed
to maximize the potential for integrating housing concerns into
local government policy and decision making while respecting
the limits of the current system of state-delegated land use
power.148  Each element of it tracks elements of existing legisla-
tion, especially the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA).149
A. HIA Regulation of Local Governments to Serve State
Housing Goals
This Article’s focus is remedying the effects of local govern-
ments’ failure to take housing impacts into consideration in their
land use decisions.  Since states delegate land use authority to
local governments, they are in the best position to regulate the
exercise of that discretion and therefore the best level of govern-
ment to adopt an HIA requirement.  Local governments would
148 The proposed HIA regime could be designed to be more robust by the adop-
tion of any of the following changes:  (1) a standard of judicial review less deferen-
tial to local government; (2) broader standing requirements; (3) additional remedies;
(4) an administrative enforcement mechanism; (5) additional procedural require-
ments that would increase participation by stakeholders in the HIA process, e.g., a
requirement that a local government consult with adjacent local governments; (6)
mandatory regulations implementing the statute requiring, e.g., that local govern-
ments employ specified methodologies or particular standards in its housing impact
analysis; or, (7) designating judges to develop special expertise on HIA matters. See
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21167.1(b) (1996) (requiring counties of populations of
more than 200,000 to designate judges to develop special expertise on CEQA and
related land use matters).
149 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (2000).  In addition to statutory provi-
sions, CEQA Guidelines have been codified at 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15000 et
seq .  For a complete description of CEQA with references to statutory provisions,
see MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118, at § 12.3.
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implement the requirement.150
Assume a state has adopted a broad state housing goal
modeled on the Housing Act of 1949, such as “a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every state resident.”151
The HIA requirement would be enacted by state statute to pro-
mote this goal.152  The statute would consist of procedural re-
150 By local governments, this Article intends municipalities, including counties,
cities and towns, rather than special function districts, e.g., school districts.
151 A state’s legislative housing goals need not be much more specific than many
are now.  The HIA regime is only a means for better achieving those regulatory
goals.
152 NEPA and several SEPAs already allow for the possibility of considering hous-
ing impacts as a species of “socio-economic impacts.”  Generally, “socio-economic
impacts” are project impacts that do not manifest themselves directly  as changes in
the physical environment (e.g., air and water) but may indirectly cause effects in the
physical environment (e.g., creation of jobs may lead to more traffic).  Cases decided
under two SEPAs (New York and California) require such consideration in certain
circumstances. See  Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that California’s environ-
mental statute required consideration of housing impacts under the category of
“growth-inducing impacts” that might cause physical impacts in the environment
outside of a project’s boundaries and finding the discussion in the EIR under review
adequate) (discussed supra  note 98); Chinese Staff Workers Ass’n v. City of New
York, 502 N.E.2d 176 (N.Y. 1986) (requiring consideration of the possible impacts a
proposed luxury housing development might have on displacement of low-income
local residents and businesses in city’s determination of whether an environmental
impact statement would be required under city regulations implementing the state
environmental statute).  Given these decisions, instead of adopting a separate stat-
ute for housing impacts as proposed here, the Article’s objective would arguably be
met by revising NEPA and SEPAs to add a requirement that “housing impacts” be
considered within the same process.  This approach would arguably integrate consid-
eration of all relevant impacts in one report following one process.  This approach
has been rejected for several reasons.  The Chinese Staff  decision turned on New
York’s environmental protection statute’s unusually broad definition of “environ-
ment” which explicitly includes “existing patterns of population concentration, dis-
tribution, or growth, and existing community or neighborhood character.” Id.  at
179-80.  Such a broad definition of environment invites a slippery slope problem.
The results of the Napa Citizens  case and its progeny demonstrate that CEQA and
similar statutes would have to be significantly reworked to add housing as a co-equal
concern with the environment. See  Vega v. County of Los Angeles, 2002 WL 66359,
*11 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.) (unpublished case interpreting Napa Citizens  to require
consideration of “the physical changes resulting from housing issues,” such as traffic
congestion and air pollution, but not the housing needs themselves.); County of
Santa Cruz v. City of San Jose, 2003 WL 1566913, *21 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.) (unpub-
lished case finding that CEQA only requires a general discussion of projected
growth effects.).  Just adding a “housing impact” section to NEPA or a SEPA would
not accomplish this Article’s goal.  As environmental protection statutes, they pre-
dictably subordinate housing issues to environmental concerns.  Housing would
likely remain in the status of a “poor relation” to environmental protection without
a thorough re-writing of the statute, including extending a duty to mitigate housing
impacts  not just the environmental impacts that result from socio-economic impacts.
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quirements (described, infra) and an explicit legislative policy
that local governments “avoid or mitigate significant adverse
housing impacts whenever it is feasible to do so.”153  Feasibility
would be defined as it is in CEQA.154  Like CEQA, the statute
would provide for the possibility that localities might approve a
project that would have significant negative effects on housing if
it adopted a “statement of overriding considerations” with find-
ings supported by substantial evidence.155
The statute’s requirements would apply to local government
land use decisions and policy-making.156  Following Professor
Williams’s suggestion and the analysis in Part I, the HIA require-
ment would apply to the whole range of local governments’ deci-
sions that affect housing.157  Unless exempted by the statute, or
regulations if any were authorized, the requirement would apply
to the full range of local government discretionary actions that
may affect housing:  infrastructure planning and financing deci-
sions, planning and zoning decisions such as the adoption and
amendment of general (or comprehensive) plans and specific
Second, combining the two types of impacts in one report would defeat one of this
Article’s primary purposes—to force local government to be the forum in which
these tensions and sometimes necessary tradeoffs are explicitly addressed and, ide-
ally, the subject of serious deliberation.  In a consolidated environmental/housing
impact report the tensions and tradeoffs would probably come “pre-packaged” and
apparently resolved when it was presented to the local legislative body.  If this were
true, the likelihood of local elected officials facing the hard choices and making
thoughtful decisions would be less than if there were two impact reports (environ-
mental and housing) which clearly considered the issues from the two perspectives
and left the deliberations to the local decisions-makers.  Third, the environmental
impact issues and the housing impact issues are sufficiently distinct and the relations
between them sufficiently complex that it would make the consolidated impact re-
port too complex to be useful.  To the degree that NEPA/SEPA critics are correct in
their complaint that current EIRs are already too complex to be useful, a combined
report would draw further (and perhaps justified) criticism.
153 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (2000) (legislative policy); Johnston & Mc-
Cartney, Local Government Implementation of Mitigation Requirements Under the
California Environmental Quality Act , 11 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESS. REV. 53 (1991).
154 “Feasible” is defined as “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner
within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental,
social, and technological factors.” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (1996).
155 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21001.1; 21081(c) (1996).
156 An actual statute enacting an HIA regime should apply to state agencies, but
this analysis is omitted because this Article focuses on local governments’ impact on
housing.
157 If the HIA applied only to a locality’s review of specific development projects,
it would be much less effective because the analysis would miss the critical decisions
by the local government to privilege certain land uses by its zoning and infrastruc-
ture decisions.
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plans,158 approval of development agreements, zoning and rezon-
ing, subdivision approvals, variance, special use permits, and
building permits (when discretionary).159  For discussion pur-
poses, any of these actions, whether initiated by the local govern-
ment itself or in response to a private party’s application, will be
called a “project.”
B. The Preparation of a Preliminary Housing
Impact Assessment
For any covered local government land use project, the local
government must prepare a preliminary housing impact assess-
ment (PHIA) to determine if the project may have a significant
adverse impact on the supply, affordability or availability of
housing.
There are at least three types of “adverse impacts” to housing
that could be investigated and considered for their potential level
of “significance.”  The first type of adverse impact is that the pro-
ject will decrease the supply, affordability or availability of hous-
ing likely to be available in the jurisdiction in the future.160  The
second type is that the project will increase demand for housing,
including affordable housing, in the jurisdiction that will not be
met by the host jurisdiction under its current zoning and other
policies.161  A third type is that a project will have a disparate
158 The analysis required of a comprehensive plan or a zoning ordinance may be
functionally compared to a “program EIS,” while the analysis required under an
HIA for a specific development project would be like a “project EIS.”  For an excel-
lent discussion of the benefits and difficulties of such programmatic impact assess-
ments in the environmental context, see Cooper, supra , note 131.
159 Professor Daniel Mandelker, the APA, and others have argued that local gov-
ernments’ specific land use decisions and planning work should be better integrated
and have advanced concrete proposals to this end. See , e.g. , Daniel Mandelker,
Melding State Environmental Policy Acts with Land Use Planning and Regulations ,
49 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 3 (1997); AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIA-
TION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK ch. 12 (2002).  This Article offers
a “second-best” solution to the major reforms envisioned by this ideal.  In states
with comprehensive planning requirements incorporating a detailed housing ele-
ment, the integration urged by Mandelker and others could occur if an HIA were
adopted that applied to the adoption of comprehensive plans.
160 This impact would occur, for example, if a jurisdiction rezoned residential land
to commercial use or reduced the minimum allowable density of land currently
zoned residential.  Similarly, this adverse impact might result from a city’s decision
to forego access to additional sewage or water capacity.  This category could include
projects such as increasing regulatory requirements or standards.
161 This impact would occur, for example, if a city approved a commercial devel-
opment that would employ low-wage workers when the city’s own housing supply
would not likely be increased to provide housing affordable to the workers and,
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impact on housing available to members of protected classes
under the federal Fair Housing Act and/or increase racial resi-
dential segregation in the jurisdiction.162
The subject of the HIA is the potential impacts on the housing
opportunities of the intended beneficiaries of the regulation, e.g.,
persons living in substandard housing, overcrowded housing or
enduring excessive housing cost burdens within the jurisdiction,
and homeless people in the jurisdiction.163  The HIA does not
consider impacts of proposed projects on the currently well-
housed within the jurisdiction unless a proposed action would
take away or degrade their housing to a significant level.
Under the proposed model, a significance threshold for each of
these potential housing impacts would be specified as a percent-
age of change from a previous state of affairs.164  Alternatively,
“significance” could be defined qualitatively.165  The HIA would
address both harms to housing stock currently available to the
regulatory beneficiaries within the jurisdiction and harms to their
housing interests or future housing opportunities in the jurisdic-
tion.166  The HIA would be structured to require local govern-
ments to address the potential impacts to a variety of different
types of housing and at various household income levels, e.g.,
multi-family rental, homeownership, senior housing, and special
needs.
based upon historical trends, foreseeable housing vacancy rates of the types of hous-
ing that the workers need would be low.
162 Including this impact expands the scope of harms to include “fair housing”
concerns, i.e., those that should be considered in the “Analysis of Impediments to
Fair Housing Choice” requirement of the federally-mandated Consolidated Plan,
supra  note 97.  Including this impact in effect incorporates federal fair housing law
into local governments’ land use decisions.
163 See  Norman Williams, Jr., The Three Systems of Land Use Control (Or, Exclu-
sionary Zoning and Revision of the Enabling Legislation) , 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 80,
98 (1970) (“[i]n a new system a critical point would be to give direct legal status to,
and recognition of [the third party nonbeneficiaries of the system].”).
164 An early version of the proposed federal “housing impact analysis” bill, supra
note 98, specified a five percent change as the trigger of significance.  If significance
is a function of the threshold size of development or of effect, the measure becomes
similar to that used in development of regional impact regimes.
165 See , e.g. , CEQA’s definition of “significant effect on the environment,” CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 21068 (1976) (“a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse
change in the environment”).  Individual actions that may have a significant effect
cumulatively are also subject to the impact assessment requirement. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21083(b)(2) (1981).
166 This could include affordable housing with expiring restrictions, or it could
include actions that might cause sharp increases in housing prices that might force
current renters out of the jurisdiction such as gentrification.
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C. Adoption of a Negative Declaration or Preparation of a
Full HIA
If the PHIA finds that the project would not cause any signifi-
cant housing impact, the local government would adopt a “nega-
tive declaration,” terminating the HIA process.  If the PHIA
finds that the project may cause a significant housing impact, but
the impact could be mitigated to a level of insignificance and the
project proponent modifies the project to incorporate the mitiga-
tion measures, the local government could adopt a “mitigated
negative declaration” expressing its findings, thereby terminating
the HIA process.167
Otherwise, if the PHIA finds that the project may cause a sig-
nificant housing impact, a full HIA process would be required.
The local government would be required to produce a draft HIA
(DHIA).168  If an HIA is required, the agency may involve regu-
lated entities and regulatory beneficiaries in “scoping” meetings
at which issues needing to be addressed are raised, appropriate
methodologies and other resources are identified, and initial al-
ternatives to the proposed project and potential mitigations are
brainstormed.169  The DHIA would be required to include a
specification of potentially significant housing impacts, alterna-
tives to the proposal that would generate fewer or less significant
housing impacts, and measures that could mitigate significant
housing impacts.  The local government would be required to dis-
tribute the DHIA to the public and interested agencies (includ-
ing adjacent local governments) and hold a public hearing for
comment.  Once a DHIA is complete and disseminated, inter-
ested persons may make responses to the DHIA in the form of
comments on the identified housing impacts, suggested alterna-
167 Environmental advocates dispute the value of “mitigated negative declara-
tions.”  On the one hand, the agency is apparently committing itself to some mitiga-
tion measures, but many fear that to avoid preparing a complete EIS, these agencies
analyses are “based on less rigorous scientific evidence, little or no public participa-
tion, and consideration of fewer alternatives.” MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra
note 118, at 11-19.  Professor Karkkainen proposes a “contingent FONSI,” a revised
version of “findings of no significant impact” (the NEPA equivalent of CEQA’s mit-
igated negative declarations) as a potentially useful reform of NEPA.  Karkkainen,
Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, at 942-46.
168 Complications that would be caused by allowing delegation of the preparation
of the HIA (the principal-agent problem) are beyond the scope of this Article.
169 A recent law passed in California, codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.7
(2001), revises CEQA’s procedural duties to require agencies to call at least one
“scoping” meeting for a project of statewide, regional, or area-wide significance and
to provide notice to any person who has filed a written request to be notified.
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tives, and proposed mitigations at the public hearing at which it is
released and during the public comment period.  The local gov-
ernment would be required to produce a final HIA (FHIA)
which would include responses to comments received.  The local
government would adopt the FHIA at a public hearing before
making a decision on the project.  Interested persons may again
testify at this public hearing.
D. The Adoption of a Final HIA
In making a final decision on the project, the local government
would be required to adopt its FHIA with findings supported by
substantial evidence in the record.  At this time, the government
would have three options:  (1) it could deny the project because
it deems the housing impacts are not able to be sufficiently miti-
gated; (2) it could approve a revised project which includes miti-
gation measures believed to reduce significant housing impacts to
a level of insignificance; or (3) it could adopt a “Statement of
Overriding Considerations” (SOC) expressing its view that, while
the project to be approved will have significant housing impacts
that may not be mitigated, other specified considerations justify
approving the project.
E. Judicial Review
The statute would provide for judicial review of the local gov-
ernment’s compliance with HIA requirements.  Persons and or-
ganizations with standing could challenge the local government’s
decision to issue a negative declaration or a mitigated negative
declaration, the adequacy of a FHIA, the sufficiency of a SOC, or
any procedural failures.  At a minimum, inadequately housed
persons living within the jurisdiction, housing developers and or-
ganizations operating within the jurisdiction, and adjacent local
governments would qualify for standing.170
The standard of review for all challenges on non-compliance
with the statute would be the “prejudicial abuse of discretion”
170 See  Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the Benefits
and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development , 30 IND. L. REV. 659, 661–663
(1997) (discussing standing issues); Town of Mesilla v. City of Las Cruces, 898 P.2d
121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (adjacent city has standing  to sue city for rezoning that
may cause aesthetic and economic injury; plaintiff town was attempting to protect
the quality of life in its boundaries, not exercise its policy power outside of its own
boundaries).
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standard.171  Challenges to the adequacy of FHIA, the adequacy
of mitigation measures, and the sufficiency of a SOC would be
reviewed under the same standard and the “rule of reason.”  The
standard remedy for successful litigation would be injunctive re-
lief forcing the city to either produce an HIA (if it did not and
should have), to prepare an adequate HIA (if it initially pro-
duced an inadequate one), to prepare a legally sufficient SOC, or
to perform any other required but neglected procedural duty.
Declaratory relief could be provided when appropriate.
F. Mitigation
Avoiding and mitigating significant housing impacts would be
the central focus of the HIA regime.  Carrying forward Professor
Williams’s insight that all three land use control systems can af-
fect housing, broadly speaking “adverse housing impacts” can
have three components:  financial, land/zoning, and infrastruc-
ture.172  To be effective, mitigation of housing impacts may need
to include the same three components.  In part, this means that
mitigations in the HIA context would not fall solely on develop-
ers.  Subject to “takings” and other limitations, local govern-
ments could pass on some portion of the financial or land
component to developers as is currently done in the cases of
housing impact fees and land dedications.173  Local governments
171 “An ‘abuse of discretion’ is established [under CEQA] if the agency has not
proceeded as required ‘by law’ or if its decision is not supported by ‘substantial
evidence.’” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21168.5 (1972).
172 Except where vacancy rates are consistently high, housing demand must be
met by increasing the supply of housing services.  In a low vacancy market, housing
services can be increased by overcrowding or by adding additional housing units to
the housing stock.  Overcrowding is not a preferred public policy for many reasons.
Additional housing development can be of similar densities to current ones or at
higher densities, making more efficient use of scarce land.  Assuming that to a large
extent the preferred public policy to meet housing demand will be to create addi-
tional housing units, there are three dimensions to accommodating the housing de-
mand:  available land with appropriate zoning; availability of necessary
infrastructure; and, in some cases, filling the financial gap to make construction and
maintenance of housing affordable.  Thus, when considered from the standpoint of
meeting housing needs by producing additional housing, there are three dimensions
to “housing impacts.”  This analysis assumes the availability and interest of capable
private for-profit and/or non-profit housing developers to actually build and operate
the new housing where adequate land properly zoned and serviced by infrastructure
and sufficient financing exists.
173 When local governments require developers seeking discretionary land use ap-
provals to provide possessory interests in land or pay impact fees to the local gov-
ernment as a condition of receiving the approval, the condition may be challenged as
a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment “just compensation” clause of the U.S. Con-
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would also be required to adopt feasible zoning and infrastruc-
ture mitigations to reduce housing impacts to an insignificant
level.
Mitigation could include negotiating with a developer of a
commercial project to revise the project to include residential
uses or assessing a housing linkage fee.174  A local government
anticipating extensive commercial development might adopt a
housing linkage fee ordinance to simplify the HIA process on
such projects and create predictability for developers.  Mitigation
could also be achieved by the local government reducing its de-
velopment standards to reduce the cost of producing housing in
the jurisdiction, rezoning commercial land into residential land,
increasing the minimum required density of existing residen-
tially-zoned land, or adopting an inclusionary zoning ordinance
or other policies generating a relatively predictable amount of
units.175
stitution.  In such a case, courts will test the constitutionality of the condition by
applying the tests articulated in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission , 483 U.S.
825 (1987) (there must be an “essential nexus” between a legitimate government
interest and the condition), and Dolan v. City of Tigard , 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (condi-
tion must be roughly proportional to negative impacts caused by the proposed de-
velopment).  Under a properly administered HIA regime, the Nollan /Dolan
requirements would be satisfied. Nollan ’s “essential nexus” test would be met be-
cause conditions would not be imposed upon a development until after a housing
impact analysis was performed in which it was found that the development would
cause a significant housing impact, and the mitigation requirement imposed on the
development (e.g., housing impact fees) would have a direct and logical relationship
to curing the housing impact identified.  The Dolan  “rough proportionality” test
would be satisfied because the nature and extent of the mitigation obligation would
be determined by an individualized assessment of the proposed development’s im-
pact on housing contained in the HIA statement.  Any mitigation measure not con-
sidered under the Nollan /Dolan  analysis would be subject to the ad hoc balancing
test of Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. New York City , 438 U.S. 104
(1978).  A case decided in 2001, which may be the first case testing an inclusionary
zoning ordinance against a facial takings attack, found that it was not a taking.
Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. V. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 60 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
174 Like CEQA, the HIA regime would not give additional powers to local gov-
ernments for mitigation; they would need to use their existing powers which are
wholly adequate. See supra  note 44 and accompanying text.
175 In some jurisdictions, mitigating the land/zoning and infrastructure compo-
nents would require local governments to zone sufficient land for residential use at
appropriate densities.  In jurisdictions with sufficient housing supply but limited af-
fordability, different measures would be appropriate.  For each type of negative im-
pact to housing identified through the HIA process, various types of mitigations may
be appropriate.  If existing housing is to be demolished, mitigation includes replace-
ment requirements of the type found in public housing law and in some states’ rede-
velopment law, e.g., California.  Conversion of existing residential units to hotel uses
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IV
TWO REGULATORY PARADIGMS
Part IV considers whether an HIA regime including both for-
mal legal rules (procedural requirements) and a legislative policy
(mitigation obligation) could benefit housing through two dis-
tinct regulatory paradigms.  The first paradigm, the Interest
Group Representation (representation paradigm) is analyzed in
Section A.  In this paradigm, the HIA regime generates informa-
tion that identifies specific objectives for housing supporters to
pursue by traditional political means and through litigation.  The
state regulates by enabling the formation of local housing move-
ments which pressure and restrain local governments to serve
state housing goals.
A second more complex paradigm (reflexive law paradigm) is
analyzed in Section B.  In this paradigm, the HIA regime revises
the norms that guide local government decision making about
housing.  Decision making under these norms favors housing out-
comes more frequently because consideration of housing impacts
has become internalized by the key participants and integrated
into the decision making system.  In this regime, the state regu-
lates by urging local governments to adopt norms that are consis-
tent with localism, yet promote state housing goals.
A. The Interest Group Representation Paradigm
In the representation paradigm, housing interests of persons
who are inadequately housed are recognized as being insuffi-
ciently represented in current local governments’ decision mak-
ing because of the historical lack of effective participation of
these persons or those representing their interests in political and
policy making processes.  In this paradigm, the HIA regime
could be successful by eliciting broad and sustained participation
in its processes, in effect, by creating local housing movements
wielding significant political and legal power.  The interests of
the components of the local housing movements are by no means
monolithic.  Yet their cumulative numbers and sophistication ef-
fect a change in the attention and consideration local govern-
ments give to housing concerns.  The housing movement
could be mitigated by a conversion ordinance. See , e.g. , San Remo Hotel L.P. v. San
Francisco, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (Cal. 2002) (upholding San Francisco’s Housing
Conversion Ordinance against a taking claim).
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demands the analysis promised by the HIA regime and uses it to
press local governments to adopt measures to avoid and mitigate
significant housing impacts as well as to adopt policies favorable
to housing.  The housing movement makes full use of the HIA
regime’s procedural mandates, and often litigates to enforce
every aspect of the HIA regime.  Strong local housing move-
ments are a primary reason why local governments attending to
the housing needs of their residents actually do so.176
1. Fostering Local Housing Movements
The HIA regime creates numerous opportunities for participa-
tion and engagement by regulated entities, regulatory benefi-
ciaries, and other members of the public.177  Each local
government regularly makes decisions that would be subject to
the HIA requirements.  While not all decisions would require a
full HIA process, there would likely be at least one such decision
at every city council or board of supervisors meeting. In many
jurisdictions, such meetings are held every two weeks. These par-
ticipation opportunities far exceed any provided by previous reg-
ulatory frameworks states have used to regulate local
governments to promote housing goals.  In principle, they are
sufficient to foster a significant housing movement.  Indeed, one
reviewer of a SEPA in a small state fairly gushed at the potential
such a regime has for eliciting participation.178  She opined that
the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act expands “the
number of potential guardians of the public interest in the envi-
ronment into the millions, instead of relying exclusively on the
176 For example, in 2002, a local housing group in Oakland, California, helped
pass a “just cause eviction” ordinance. See  Measure EE (Just Cause for Eviction
Law), available at  http://www.justcauseoakland.org/home/index.php (last visited Jan.
18, 2004).  Moreover, due to the efforts of housing advocates in San Diego, Califor-
nia, that city declared a “housing state of emergency,” passed a fifty-five million
dollar bond for affordable housing, and adopted an inclusionary zoning ordinance
and an expedited permit process for infill and affordable housing. See  Policylink,
San Diego City Council Enacts Inclusionary Housing , available at  http://
www.policylink.org/edupdates/update7.htm#Regional2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
Shelterforce Magazine  regularly publishes stories chronicling the efforts and suc-
cesses of local housing movements. See also JULIET Z. SALTMAN, OPEN HOUSING:
DYNAMICS OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 39-42 (1978) (providing a historical account
linking the open housing movement to the civil rights movement).
177 See supra  Part III, describing participation opportunities in the basic HIA
model.
178 Jennifer E. Sills, The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”):
Enabling Citizens to Speak for the Environment , 70 CONN. BAR J. 353 (1996).
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limited resources of a particular agency.”179
The housing movements will consist primarily of participants
drawn from the following groups:  regulatory beneficiaries, hous-
ing advocates, other community organizations, public interest at-
torneys, and housing developers (both for-profit and non-
profit).180  These participants will be joined in their work at times
by adjacent local governments, smart growth environmentalists
interested in social equity, business groups concerned about
workforce housing,181 and housing or planning department insid-
ers.  In various ways, the HIA regime lures these groups into
participation.
The intended regulatory beneficiaries of an HIA requirement
are persons who are not currently adequately or affordably
housed, e.g., those within the jurisdiction in substandard and
overcrowded housing and those shouldering excessive housing
costs.  Admittedly, getting regulatory beneficiaries involved
would be a challenge.182  The HIA regime does not solve the col-
lective action problem presented by the weak and diffuse interest
individual intended beneficiaries have in participating in local
governments’ land use decisions that may impact their housing
interests.  The HIA only provides a much-needed focus, frequent
opportunity, and incentive for organizing by intended benefi-
179 Id.  at 353.
180 Each of the groups mentioned has a direct interest in promoting or opposing
housing development.  And, historically, each have been involved in local govern-
ment housing policy and project decisions.
181 See , e.g. , Terry J. Tondro, Sprawl and Its Enemies:  An Introductory Discussion
of Two Cities’ Efforts to Control Sprawl , 34 CONN. L. REV. 511, 518 (2002).  “The
Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group—made up of CEO’s—actively presses local
zoning commissions to approve the development of affordable housing near employ-
ment centers.” Id.  at 518.  Local chambers of commerce whose members often em-
ploy service workers earning relatively low wages have actively engaged in local
housing policy-making and decisions. See , e.g. , Tim Iglesias, New Approach to
NIMBY , 12 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. 78, 88 (2002) (discussing sup-
port from “the Napa Valley Wine Train, the Chamber of Commerce, the Hispanic
Network, the Conference Visitation Bureau, and others” for a seventeen unit low-
income housing development in the City of Napa, California).
182 See  Luke Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists:
Three Models of Environmental Advocacy , 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995) (analyzing
specific opportunities for participation provided by EISs and how to use them).
Note that organizing individuals to participate in public discussions about the hous-
ing impacts of particular project proposals is likely to be easier than mobilizing them
repetitively for longer-term planning processes.  Moreover, part of the HIA’s effec-
tiveness is that it requires local governments themselves to conduct analysis and
consideration of potential housing impacts on the intended beneficiaries whether or
not they actually participate.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-2\ORE204.txt unknown Seq: 55  4-MAR-04 10:49
Housing Impact Assessments 487
ciaries to overcome the collective action problem.  Usually, in-
tended beneficiaries must first fight and use substantial
organizing and political capital to get recognized and to win a
place for their voices and interests.  However, HIA provides an
established “place” for their voices, a structure that waits for and
expects their interests to be expressed.183  Accommodation by
the HIA regime could attract and enable their participation. But
the effectiveness of the HIA regime does not depend upon broad
participation by the primary regulatory beneficiaries because it is
likely to promote substantial participation by groups represent-
ing the beneficiaries’ interests.
The establishment of the HIA regime provides housing devel-
opers and housing advocates with particularly strong incentives
to participate.  It generally lowers their costs to participate be-
cause they will not have to attract attention to housing impacts or
justify their participation in a decision affecting housing.  The
HIA regime also generally increases the potential benefits to be
gained from housing developers’ and advocates’ participation
both because the HIA process identifies specific objectives for
their advocacy in the project alternatives and proposed mitiga-
tions, and because the HIA regime makes it more likely that they
can influence local governments to make better housing deci-
sions.  Of course, housing developers and advocates will weigh
relative costs and benefits of participation in any given decision.
They will invest their efforts in seeking to influence decisions
with the best ratio of benefits to costs.  This might mean focusing
on decisions that are likely to be close so that their efforts might
provide the necessary pressure to win an important vote.
Non-profit developers would bring a special concern for low-
income housing as well as technical skills enabling them to con-
tribute to high-level discussions, e.g., about feasibility of a pro-
posed mitigation.  For-profit housing developers, including multi-
family rental housing developers, are another potentially impor-
tant group.  Home builder groups are already well-organized and
attentive to local housing policy.  To be sure, they will often disa-
gree with the other elements of the housing movement.  These
183 The HIA strategy addresses both the structural elements of subordination (by
procedurally creating a place and a hearing specifically for historically-slighted hous-
ing interests) and the desire on the part of subordinated groups to experience their
individual and collective agency (by creating opportunities for specific individuals
and groups to speak, organize, lead and help create housing opportunities for them-
selves and others in their group).
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developers are likely to focus on the negative housing impacts
arguably created by local governments’ regulatory standards and
even point out the potential negative effects on housing of cer-
tain policies favored by non-profit affordable housing develop-
ers, such as inclusionary zoning or housing impact fees.  This
conflict would probably foster lively and broad participation in
the HIA process.
In cases where significant spillover impacts are feared, nearby
local governments would be likely to participate.  The participa-
tion and enforcement opportunities provided by the HIA regime
will change their cost-benefit calculus for paying attention to
nearby cities’ decisions that may cause housing impact spillovers
in their jurisdiction.  In other words, the HIA regime provides
adjacent local governments with a legal tool specifically designed
to enable them to pressure a neighboring government to inter-
nalize the housing impacts caused by its decisions.  Currently, lo-
cal governments often consult with each other on environmental
issues because of and through the procedures afforded by NEPA
and SEPAs.  They are likely to take the opportunity to do the
same on housing issues under an HIA regime.184
While some environmentalists might attempt to use the HIA
process to undermine its regulatory goals, others may actively
support housing, especially if it is likely to be infill, higher density
housing and located near transit.  Environmentalist supporters of
housing would often bring substantial direct experience in using
NEPA or a SEPA to achieve environmental goals.  They could
mentor housing advocates in making the most effective use of the
regime.
When large or particularly important projects or policies are
under consideration, the state housing or community develop-
ment agency185 or a regional planning body (if one exists) would
be more likely to participate, provide comments, as well as sug-
gest alternatives and mitigations.186
184 The active participation by nearby cities before each of the CEQA lawsuits
concerning “housing impacts,” supra  note 98, confirms the reasonableness of this
assumption.  (Author has on file court briefs detailing local governments’ participa-
tion in CEQA procedures prior to litigation).
185 Currently in California, the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment receives a copy of any EIS produced by a local government.  Typically, the
agency has no significant involvement unless it receives a complaint.
186 For a proposal to increase the level and effectiveness of executive oversight in
the NEPA context that might be transferable to the HIA context, see William L.
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Historically, other housing laws have not elicited widespread,
sustained local housing movements.  However, the HIA regime
may help overcome many of the obstacles to organization and
sustainability of local housing movements.  It offers many more
opportunities for participation, a more diverse set of possible
roles for non-lawyers, and the potential for significant impact on
local housing policy.  Together, these groups could cumulatively
sustain strong local housing movements.
In general, the more participation, and the more sophisticated
participation, the more effective the HIA would be.187  Over
time, the arguments about housing impacts, analyses of them,
and suggested mitigations will become more familiar to local
housing movements and local governments.  With experimenta-
tion, local governments will learn about and share which analyses
are more predictive and which mitigation measures are most ef-
fective.  If their advocacy is strong, local housing movements will
successfully create political pressure on local governments to
avoid harms to housing and to balance competing needs more in
favor of housing.
2. Pressuring Local Governments
Pro-housing participants are empowered by the formal rules
guaranteeing participation.  They are now part of the process.
They now have relevant information generated by the formal
rules process or can demand it.  They now have power to add
information and suggestions and to pressure the government for
adequate analysis and feasible mitigations.
The HIA would add an important element to the political bal-
ancing process that is currently often missing:  regular, specific,
informed, and accountable consideration of an action’s impact on
housing in the jurisdiction by a local housing movement. In this
way, HIA creates a new balance of power, tilting a bit toward
housing interests.  The HIA regime makes housing an issue when
it often was not, and because so many local governments’ land
use decisions have significant housing implications, this issue will
Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise:  The Role of Executive Oversight in the
Implementation of Environmental Policy , 64 IND. L.J. 205 (1989).
187 William A. Tilleman, Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment Process:  A Comparative Study of Impact Assessment in Canada, the United
States and the European Community , 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 346 (1995)
(“[t]he degree of participation affects the quality of the [environmental impact anal-
ysis] process, which in turn affects the quality of the decision about a project.”).
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keep coming up.  Adding housing issues regularly into a broader
range of decisions creates opportunities for housing to get some-
thing and for tradeoffs that can benefit housing.  The challenge
facing the pro-housing participants is to leverage the HIA re-
gime’s formal procedural rules and its legislative policy (viz.
housing impacts should be mitigated when feasible) into informal
rules, practices and policies that actually avoid housing harms,
mitigate housing impacts, and otherwise further housing
interests.
The housing movement’s opportunity to influence comes from
the fact that the interests of local governments and developers in
development decisions are not absolute but relative and subject
to complex cost and benefit analysis.  Time and money are al-
most always important to the developer, and thus to the govern-
ment if it wants to approve a project.  The housing movement
will use the information generated by the HIA regime, its own
ideas and arguments as well as procedural tactics to pressure lo-
cal governments and the developers for compromises and
changes in the project’s design, scope, timing or other dimen-
sions.  At the government’s insistence, proposed developments
can be, and often are, revised in a wide variety of ways to serve
several objectives while still maintaining profitability.  Some-
times, local governments provide a contribution to the develop-
ment (e.g., land) or give a concession to the developer for a
desired change.  For example, a government might increase the
permissible density on a given area of land so that a developer
can build more units in the project.  The “density bonus” can ei-
ther increase the supply of housing a proposal will provide, or
can be structured to provide some affordable units at the same
rate of return.
Local governments will develop reputations for how strongly
they enforce the HIA regime.  This information will be commu-
nicated among cooperative developers.  All else being equal, de-
velopers will prefer to develop in cities where the HIA regime is
less burdensome than other cities.  Apart from changes in cur-
rent municipal finance, cities which desire to attract commercial
development will want to make the HIA regime easier for devel-
opers.188  If cities try to do this by blatantly evading the procedu-
ral mandates, they risk enforcement actions by housing
188 On the public choice model, the addition of the HIA regime will introduce
another element to competition among cities for voter-consumer-taxpayers but also
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developers, housing advocates and adjacent local governments
bringing delays and costs that contradict their goal.  For this rea-
son, cities are more likely to soften the requirements in a more
sophisticated way.  However, faced with a strong and equally so-
phisticated housing movement, they are more likely to adopt ei-
ther token measures or decide to accommodate the housing
movement by adopting various policies and practices (e.g., pre-
meeting with developers to orient them to local requirements
and policies that anticipate the need to mitigate housing impacts)
that meet the housing movement’s demands, but reduce delays
and uncertainties facing developers.  Moving resistant govern-
ments from token measures to substantial ones will be a test of
the strength of the housing movement.
When the housing movement is successful, developers will
often accommodate the new demands.189  For example, commer-
cial developers seek to maximize profits and highly value speedy
and predictable approvals for their proposals both because time
is truly money to them and because the profitability of their pro-
posals is based upon particular market predictions.  Given these
clear goals and preferences, once the HIA regime is established,
it will be in the rational self-interest of commercial developers to
consider proposing projects with fewer housing impacts and/or
which incorporate some mitigation of inevitable housing impacts.
By doing this, they are likely to either avoid an HIA altogether
(by getting a negative declaration or mitigated negative declara-
tion), or at least have a quicker process than would occurr if they
ignore the HIA regime.  Local governments’ staff and elected of-
for desired development.  The argument here is that courts’ enforcement of the HIA
regime will establish a “floor” for HIA practices.
189 A popular handbook for developers published by the Urban Land Institute (a
non-profit organization serving developers’ interests) counsels such an approach:
The interplay of private development activities with public regulation need
not be an adversarial one.  The benefits of cooperation—and the costs of
conflict—far outweigh the benefits of unwilling compromises reach
through confrontation and struggle. . . . By using a cooperative approach,
private developers and public officials can focus their energies on planning
to achieve an appropriate quality of development, rather than on coun-
tering each other’s tactics.  Besides assuring higher quality, cooperation
does, after all, lower development costs.  Cooperation reduces delays and
risks, assures a more orderly process of development, eases the timely pro-
vision of needed infrastructure, and avoids litigation, with its diversion of
both funds and attention from community development.
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, WORKING WITH THE COMMUNITY:  A DEVELOPER’S
GUIDE 3-4 (1985).
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ficials are likely to welcome such enlightened self-interested pro-
posals because it is easier for them to apply and complete their
duties under the HIA regime.
As local governments and developers adjust to the HIA re-
gime, local housing movements within a region could coordinate
to learn lessons from each other and support each other’s cam-
paigns to become more effective.  However, political pressure
alone will not be enough to win many conflicts.
3. Judicial Enforcement of the HIA Regime and
Complementary Housing Laws
The challenge facing local housing movements is using their
enforcement rights to leverage recognition and application of the
housing mitigation policy through judicial enforcement of the
HIA regime’s formal rules (the procedural requirements).  They
may also advance their interests by using the HIA regime to in-
crease enforcement of complementary housing laws.
NEPA and especially SEPA jurisprudence provide compelling
evidence that courts would be competent to enforce an HIA re-
gime.190  In a manner parallel to NEPA and SEPAs, potential en-
forcement problems of the HIA regime itself include:  failure of a
city to apply an HIA requirement when it should be applied,
HIAs with inadequate content, other procedural failures (not
publishing a DHIA or not holding a public hearing), and the
adoption of an insufficient SOC.191  The federal judiciary and
state judiciaries already have vast experience enforcing NEPA.
California’s courts have decided many important issues in the
CEQA context that would likely arise if states were to adopt an
HIA requirement modeled on CEQA and impose it on local gov-
ernments.  For example, state courts have determined that
CEQA’s impact assessment requirements may be required on a
wide range of government projects as well as on private develop-
ment projects.192  Furthermore, they have determined in numer-
ous cases when “the discussion of environmental impacts in an
impact report was adequate, that environmental impacts were
mitigated, or that the agency had properly adopted a statement
190 See generally , MANDELKER, NEPA LAW, supra  note 118 (especially Chapter
12, State Environmental Policy Acts).
191 See id.  at § 12.24, 12-99 and cases collected interpreting CEQA in n.21.
192 Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972) (ap-
plying CEQA to a conditional use permit).
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of overriding considerations.”193  CEQA case law and some
NEPA case law would likely be persuasive authority on parallel
issues as they arise in the HIA context.
A common problem that the housing movement is likely to
face is that resistant governments may simply abide by the formal
procedural requirements, but on every occasion adopt a SOC,
refusing to mitigate significant housing impacts even where, in
the view of housing advocates, useful mitigation was feasible.
The proposed regime requires that findings supporting a SOC
must be supported by substantial evidence in the record.194
Courts can apply this substantial evidence standard of review in a
manner more or less deferential to local governments.  The typi-
cal remedy for a successful plaintiff, viz. remand to the local gov-
ernment for making sufficient findings, merely gives the local
government another chance to draft more legally defensible find-
ings.195  Yet through frequent litigation of this issue, a strong
housing movement would force local governments to balance ac-
tual competing interests more carefully since they would be
aware that their findings supporting SOCs would be regularly
challenged in court.  In order to make sufficient findings, local
governments would need to identify and place in the record facts
supporting their balancing of the interests.  To the degree that
proposed policies do in fact significantly harm local housing in-
terests, more careful balancing will lead to more decisions favor-
ing housing.
Previous attempts to place housing obligations on local gov-
193 Similarly, it is unlikely that the imposition of an HIA requirement itself on a
private development project would constitute a “temporary regulatory taking.” First
English  recognized the possibility of a temporary taking and provided that damages
may be a required constitutional remedy as “compensation” under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).  Recently, the Court held in Tahoe-Sierra  that
normal delays in the administration of land use authority would not be a per se
taking under Lucas  and should generally be analyzed under the Pennsylvania Cen-
tral  ad hoc balancing factors.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328-42 (2002).  The Court also indicated that delays
longer than a year may be suspect. Id.  at 341.  It is unlikely that the HIA process
would delay projects more than a year.
194 See supra  note 149 and accompanying text.
195 Winning an injunction ordering the local government to perform its legal du-
ties under the HIA may also give advocates negotiation leverage. See  Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Note, Injunction Negotiation:  An Economic, Moral and Legal Anal-
ysis , 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563 (1975) (discussing how enjoined parties often attempt to
negotiate with successful plaintiffs to resolve litigation).
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ernments have faltered in part for lack of enforcement.196  Nota-
bly, in regard to existing enforceable housing obligations, e.g.,
fair housing law, the enforcement context is usually a local gov-
ernment’s consideration of a housing (often affordable housing)
proposal where housing advocates’ abilities and interests in
bringing a lawsuit are conflicted.197  Because the HIA regime in-
cludes within its scope the full range of local governments’ deci-
sions that can affect housing, it would provide a much broader
set of opportunities for engagement and enforcement of the HIA
regime and of complementary housing laws where the interests
of housing advocates and those who need housing would not be
so conflicted.198  This fact, combined with broad standing re-
quirements, would increase the number of enforcement actions
brought by the housing movement.
The HIA regime could also increase the pressure on local gov-
ernments to fulfill their obligations under complementary hous-
ing laws.199  Federal fair housing law already applies to all local
governments, but the HIA regime would in effect incorporate
fair housing law into local governments’ decision making in a
way that it has never been before.200  Under federal fair housing
law, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under a “disparate impact” theory by demonstrating a challenged
action causes a disparate impact on members of protected clas-
ses.201  In some cases, the HIA process may reveal significant po-
196 See  Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary
Zoning , 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1995); Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning
in Massachusetts:  Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable
Housing , 78 VA. L. REV. 535 (1992). See , e.g. , Brian Augusta, Building Housing
from the Ground Up:  Strengthening California Law to Ensure Adequate Locations
for Affordable Housing , 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 503 (1999); Ben Field, Why Our
Fair Share Housing Laws Fail , 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35 (1993); Peter W. Sal-
sich, Jr., Federal Influence on Local Land Use Regulations:  The Fair Housing Act
Amendments , J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. (Spring 2000).
197 On the one hand, housing advocates want to enforce housing obligations on
local governments, but practically, bringing a lawsuit to enforce such a duty in the
context of a particular housing proposal seeking a permit approval may sacrifice the
actual units because by the time the lawsuit is tried and won, the land or funding for
the proposal may no longer be available.
198 For example, housing advocates could bring a challenge to a local govern-
ment’s inadequate HIA regarding a proposed commercial development without fac-
ing the tradeoff described at supra  note 197.
199 See supra  note 145 and accompanying text.
200 The federal Fair Housing Act is commonly known as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
201 While the statute did not expressly provide for a disparate impact theory, all
federal circuits recognize it (although they are not in agreement on the relative bur-
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tential housing impacts constituting discriminatory impacts in a
disparate impact theory.  Because of this possible exposure, local
governments will need to identify sufficiently legitimate govern-
mental objectives to justify the impacts, or face possible fair
housing litigation.  Prior to this, the potential for enforcement of
fair housing law was so unlikely that local governments could
practically ignore it.
In addition, in jurisdictions with mandatory housing planning
requirements enforced by requirements for consistency findings,
information produced by the HIA regime identifying significant
potential housing impacts may enable advocates to challenge
consistency findings more frequently and more successfully, thus
holding local governments accountable to implementing their
adopted housing plans.  This additional enforcement of these
planning requirements would result in increasing their
importance.
Thus, litigation and threats of litigation are likely to be impor-
tant in enforcing an HIA’s requirements.  The likelihood of en-
forcement must be high enough so that local governments will
fulfill their obligations under the HIA regime.  While not all of
the groups within the housing movement would pursue issues all
the way through litigation, at least some would.  Some housing
advocacy organizations, developers, and adjacent local govern-
ments would be the most likely enforcers.
Recent inter-jurisdictional lawsuits brought under CEQA fo-
cused on spillover housing impacts.202  These litigations suggest
that the HIA regime has the potential to harness the interests of
adjacent jurisdictions in mutual, peer-to-peer enforcement of
housing obligations.  The imposition of the HIA regime will si-
multaneously make each local government more sensitive to
neighboring jurisdictions’ housing impact spillovers, provide an
appropriate tool to address those concerns, and make each juris-
diction vulnerable to similar enforcement by others.  The HIA
regime thus incorporates a local-government-to-local-govern-
ment dimension as a potential enforcement dynamic, engaging
the unique capacity of peers to hold each other accountable.203
dens of proof that plaintiffs and defendants bear in the burden shifting framework).
See , e.g. , Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2nd
Cir. 1988).
202 See supra  note 98 (describing lawsuits).
203 Professor Briffault notes that the “balance of power” in local governments
often lies in the importance of “interlocal” as opposed to state-local conflicts.  This
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The success of an HIA regime in the representative model de-
pends upon a combination of political pressure and litigation to
win concessions and compromises from local governments and
developers.  The model would typically be confrontational, plac-
ing a premium on the housing movement’s ability to rouse and
sustain itself.
Of course, many factors assumed in this success story might
not occur.  The broad participation may not materialize because
even the HIA regime does not sufficiently reduce the obstacles
to collective action.  The housing movement may often be short
on resources, including technical expertise and legal resources.
Given the diverse complexion of its membership, the conflicts
within the movement, e.g., concerning what kinds of housing
should be built and for whom, could render it weak.  Regular
participation by adjacent local governments may be necessary to
win significant victories.  Still, at least a plausible case can be
made that the HIA regime would be successful in the representa-
tion paradigm.
B. The Reflexive Law Paradigm:  Changing the Norms of
Local Governments and Instigating Self-Regulation
This subsection will consider how the enactment of the HIA
regime could be successful under the “reflexive law” paradigm in
which the primary mechanism for integrating housing concerns
into local governments’ policy and decision making is changing
the informal rules (or norms) affecting local governments’ land
use decisions.  The analysis begins by defining “reflexive law,”
distinguishing it from other regulatory strategies.  This is fol-
lowed by a description of the role of norms in local government
decision making about land use issues and a description of a pro-
cess by which the housing impact assessment requirement could
establish new norms favoring housing.
1. Reflexive Law
“Reflexive law”204 is a relatively newly identified type of regu-
conflict expresses itself in exclusionary zoning where, because of the external effects
of these local actions, “local governments are often at war with one another.”  Brif-
fault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra  note 45, at 3.
204 “Reflexive” in this context means an entity’s response to itself and awareness
of its own actions and their consequences, not in the sense of a knee-jerk “reflex” or
unconscious response to a stimulus.
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latory regime.205  While there is generally no accepted definition
of a reflexive law regime,206 it typically includes the following
two characteristics.  First, the authority creating a reflexive law
regulatory regime (e.g., state government) imposes one or more
required components, usually procedural requirements, on the
regulated entity (e.g., local government) intended to enable and
occasion “reflexive” responses to the regulatory goal by the local
government in its role as regulator, by regulated entities (e.g.,
developers) and by regulatory beneficiaries.  Second, regulated
entities and regulatory beneficiaries participate with the regula-
tor in the required procedures, and together they develop the
content and enforcement of regulatory norms.  The process of
norm development and enforcement occurs in a manner inter-
twined with both the carrying out and enforcement of the formal
rules.
Reflexive law differs from rule-based systems (such as com-
mon law rules of property, tort and contract),207 which regulate
205 See  Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? , 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 127-35 (2001) (providing a brief and lucid explication of “reflex-
ive law”); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law , 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227
(1995):
Reflexive law gets its name from being self-referential in two respects.
First, it is a self-critical legal theory.  A theory of reflexive law emphasizes
the limits of law in the face of complexity.  The complexity of society and
its problems diminishes the capacity of law to direct social change in a spec-
ified or detailed manner.  Second, a theory of reflexive law proposes an
alternative approach to law reform.  It focuses on enhancing self-referential
capacities of social systems and institutions outside the legal system, rather
than direct intervention of the legal system itself through agencies, highly
detailed statutes, or delegation of great power to courts.
Id . at 1232. See also  Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative Autonomy” of
Law , 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1988 (1998) (examining “an attempt in recent Ger-
man social thought to specify theoretically the relation between law and other social
spheres” that forms the theoretical basis for reflexive law).
206 For an alternative framing of similar issues, see Jody Freeman, The Private
Role in Public Governance , 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) (labeling this approach to
regulation “collaborative governance”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakehold-
ers:  Limits on Collaboration as the Basis For Flexible Regulation , 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 411, 421-22 (2000) (“collaborative regulation—a variant of self-regulation in
which beneficiaries of regulatory statutes are empowered to participate in regulatory
design and enforcement”); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGU-
LATION:  TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4-6 (1992); Robert B. Reich,
Public Administration and Public Deliberation:  An Interpretive Essay ,  94 YALE L.J.
1617, 1631-32 (1985).
207 Regulation through common law rules works well when society broadly recog-
nizes the substantive individual rights and their distribution, and individuals can be
reasonably expected to enforce their rights through the courts.  Where society is
unwilling or unable to define or distribute the individual rights, this form of regula-
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by granting certain rights and duties to individuals and entities
and then empowering courts to resolve ensuing conflicts among
these rights.208  Reflexive law also differs from “substantive law,”
so-called “command and control” regimes (such as the Clean Air
Act or building codes), which regulate through the imposition of
specific outcomes or substantive standards on regulated
entities.209
Because reflexive law relies on norms to constrain regulators,
regulated entities, and regulatory beneficiaries to serve the regu-
latory goals, a brief introduction to norm theory is necessary.210
tion is inapt.  Max Weber termed these rule based systems “formal law.”  Max
Weber’s theory of ideal types is explained in MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch trans. & eds., 1949).
208 Theoretically, we could solve the housing problem using formal law by either
legislatures or courts granting (or recognizing) that every individual has a right to
decent housing.  This approach has certainly been advanced and is not moribund.
The problem, of course, has been identifying who or what owes the correlative duty
to provide the housing.  The closest the United States came was in early visions of
public housing, or, in a partial sense, the federal mortgage interest deduction for
homeowners.  While discussion about potential individual housing rights continues
in some quarters (including the United Nations), the prospects for legislative or judi-
cial recognition of a substantive housing right in the United States appear remote.
See  Janet Ellen Stearns, The Impact of Habitat II on U.S. Housing Policy , 16 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 419 (1997).
209 In traditional substantive law regulatory strategies, the regulator interprets
and defines the public interest for regulatory beneficiaries and then imposes regula-
tion on the regulated entities usually by employing substantive standards that are
intended to determine outcomes.  Such regulation works well in contexts where
there is a clear “transcendent” public interest, that is “general and sufficiently im-
portant compared with any possible limiting private interest to warrant ignoring pri-
vate interests altogether.” Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental
Performance Review:  Self-Regulation in Environmental Law , 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
465, 468 (1994).  However, it does not work as well in complex policy areas where
government or its agencies are unable to adequately specify the public interest.  Re-
flexive law can also be distinguished from various market reforms, such as incentive-
based approaches in which government regulates by intervening in markets to adjust
price signals or by creating new trading markets (e.g., pollution credits) in order to
induce firms to internalize certain externalities.
210 While this account highlights changes in norms as the mechanism by which
reflexive law regulates, other theorists have articulated different mechanisms for re-
flexive law.  For example, Louise and David Trubek discuss five potential mecha-
nisms by which what is termed “reflexive law” in this Article and “soft law” in their
paper can be effective: diffusion, shaming, networks, deliberation, and learning.
David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of
Social Europe 18-21, July 2003, presented at the European University Institute’s
“Opening the Open Method of Coordination” workshop, available at  http://
eucenter.wisc.edu/Conferences/OMCnetOct03/trubek.Trubek.pdf.  Addition-al ar-
guments for an HIA regime’s effectiveness could be made using these other
mechanisms.
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Norm theory contends that compliance with formal rules and ec-
onomic rationality does not account for all of human behavior.211
Norms are a third source for explaining human conduct.  Under
this theory, humans are seen as intelligent, social  beings, atten-
tive to socially created expectations (viz. norms) in various set-
tings, i.e., their rationality is always socially situated.212  In some
situations, norms lead people to act in ways that are not required
by any formal rule and are even contrary to their “self-inter-
est.”213  There are many kinds of norms214 in myriad settings.215
211 Norm theory and traditional rational choice theory are not necessarily at odds.
See  April Mara Major, Norm Evolution and Development in Cyberspace:  Models of
Cybernorm Evolution , 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 68-70 (2000) [hereinafter, Major,
Norm Evolution] (explaining how rational choice theory can incorporate aspects of
norm theory through the notion of incentive structures and embracing a view that
“actors employ a unique combination of rational choice and norms when faced with
a decision.  The extent to which each is applied depends entirely on the substance of
the decision and the actor concerned.”).
212 Law and Society scholars have studied the relative roles of formal law (com-
mand and control) and norms in affecting human conduct for many years. See , e.g. ,
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement , 38 STAN. L. REV. 763
(1986).  Other scholarly work addressing this subject includes ROBERT C. ELLICK-
SON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994) and ERIC
A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002).
213 The phenomenon of tipping a waiter after a meal is a simple example.  There is
no formal rule or legal requirement to leave a tip, but many diners feel constrained
to leave one and do so.  Except in limited circumstances, tipping cannot be ex-
plained as an action based on the diner’s rational self-interest.  This example is taken
from Major, Norm Evolution , supra  note 211, at 59.  Norms are distinguished from
behavior that can be explained by reciprocity alone.  Norms are not individual pref-
erences and are not mere social conventions that have no normative content.  Norms
may be considered as values embedded in particular social practices.
214 There are norms concerning how we treat each other (e.g., deferring to older
people), norms about how one gets things done in a particular group (e.g., needing
to talk with a particular person before presenting a proposal to a group), and sub-
stantive norms (e.g., freedom of contract).  General social norms (e.g., saying “ex-
cuse me” after bumping into someone) that are broadly recognized throughout a
society can be distinguished from group norms (e.g., the degree of acceptable rough-
ness in a basketball game) that are only recognized in certain groups.
215 The role of norms has been studied in a wide variety of settings, including
cyberlaw, environmental law, alternative dispute resolution, corporate law, legal eth-
ics, family law, and contract law. See , e.g. , Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy
for the Digital Biosphere:  How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws , 34 CONN. L. REV.
333 (2002) (Internet norms); Christopher Van Wyk, Book Note, The Role of Equity
in Environmental Protection in the People’s Republic of China:  A Review of  Envi-
ronmental Protection in China:  Institutions, Enforcement, and Compliance, 14
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 593 (2002) (environment); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W.
Sanchirico, Symposium Norms & Corporate Law:  Competing Norms and Social
Evolution:  Is the Fittest Norm Efficient? , 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001) (corpora-
tions); Li-Ju Lee, Law and Social Norms in a Changing Society:  A Case Study of
Taiwanese Family Law , 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 413 (1999) (family).
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Norms may have their origin in spontaneous cultural practices or
in law promulgated by legislatures or decided by courts.
The establishment and development of a norm is not a
straightforward, predictable process.  Every norm is situated in a
particular social context and may have no meaning or application
outside of that context.  Across a variety of settings, norms may
vary along many parameters, e.g., they may be more or less clear
and more or less stable (resistant to change).216  Often norms can
supplement formal rules and “fill in” where formal rules leave
gaps.
Norms, by definition, have no formal legal enforcement mech-
anisms, but they have an obligatory character.  Scholars have
identified three distinct mechanisms:  first party (when a strong
norm is internalized by the actor), second party (when the victim
of a violated norm challenges the violation by taking some action
against the violator), and third party (when non-victim partici-
pants in the situation take action against the violator).217  Like
formal law, norms are not always effective in controlling human
behavior, but depending upon the norm, the setting and other
factors, they often play an important role.  In some situations,
informal rules may be more important in affecting choices and
behavior than formal rules.  Over the long term, there is a cycli-
cal relationship between formal law and norms:  law creates
norms, and law is, in turn, created by norms.218
Regulatory settings include both formal rules and norms.  In
some decision settings, formal rules will mostly control outcomes.
However, in regulatory contexts where decision-makers exercise
216 For example, certain social norms regarding gender relations have been chang-
ing in the United States (e.g., males opening doors for females or females refraining
from inviting males out on a date). See  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from
Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups , 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (2003) (arguing
that social cooperation is likely to arise and be enforced in loose-knit groups as
much as in close-knit groups albeit by different mechanisms).
217 See , e.g. , Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing
Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions , 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 370-72
(1999) (explaining first party, second party, and third party enforcement mecha-
nisms); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination , 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1027-29 (2002)
(discussing third-party enforcement).
218 Friedman, supra  note 212, at 771–72. See  Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change
Theory of Expressive Law , 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002) (reviewing debates in the
literature, proposing a positive “belief change” theory of law’s effect on social norms
and preference, and concluding that according to the model law can often create
effective second and third order sanctions to control behavior).
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broad discretion—that is, where the formal rules are not deter-
minative—norms sometimes play an important role in control-
ling outcomes.  This situation is especially likely when decisions
are polycentric and a variety of competing values are at stake.
Reflexive law addresses this type of complex regulatory situation
where norms are likely to play an important role.  Local land use
policy and decision making, especially regarding housing, is an
example of the type of policy area and context in which norms
are likely to play an important role.
2. The Role of Group Norms in Local Government
In the reflexive law view, land use decisions are best explained
by a combination of formal rules, norms, and individual prefer-
ences of elected officials.  The local government setting is charac-
terized by iterated long-term relationships in which decision-
makers regularly revisit, discuss, and make decisions about a fi-
nite set of issues including land development.  In this setting deci-
sion-makers are likely to develop “group norms” (mutual
expectations that decision-makers have of each other) and to be
influenced by them.219  Group norms will be partially determined
by broader social norms, especially the social norms that deci-
sion-makers believe voters share.220
Local government officials typically share the following four
principal group norms:221  (1) We know our own residents’ needs
219 On this view, actors are not completely autonomous; their sense of self or role
is shaped by professional and group norms.
Group social norms are informal rules of conduct that maintain the consis-
tency of group behavior, whereas societal social norms involve behavior
common to a society.  The economics and psychology literature describes
groups as two or more people who possess reciprocal abilities to influence
each other.  Groups also require a healthy interchange of group informa-
tion regarding past and present events. . . . Norms largely dictate group
behavior due to members’ expectations and obligations.  Norms actually
increase the efficacy with which group members interact with other mem-
bers because of an enhanced ability to anticipate each other’s conduct.
Consequently, group norms tend to be stronger than societal norms.
Major, Norm Evolution , supra  note 211, at 76 (footnotes omitted).
220 This analysis assumes that individual decision-makers have a set of policy pref-
erences, even strong ones, but that they are not “captured” in a strong sense of the
term.  Decision-makers may have strong views that favor a particular interest, e.g.,
business or the environment, but their set of preferences are not completely defined
in the sense that they do not provide a specific answer to each potential issue raised
by a land use decision.  Therefore, they are open to new information and are poten-
tially influenced by group norms.
221 This interpretation of typical group norms is impressionistic.  However, the
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and interests better than anyone else; (2) Our role is to serve our
residents’ needs and interests; (3) We should be responsible for
the consequences of our decisions as should the elected officials
of other local governments; and (4) We are proud of our city and
should make decisions to support that pride.222  These norms are
at the heart of the principle of local control (or “our localism”)
justifying the delegation of power to local governments by the
state.
These group norms apply to local government decision making
and balancing of interests, including housing issues.  The primary
norm regarding housing is:  Each city should take care of its own
residents’ housing needs.  The reigning view is that private mar-
kets produce housing in conjunction with local governments,
each of which have, at any given time, a set of policies, practices
and leadership that is more or less open to housing proposals.
As discussed in Part I, housing needs, including those of the juris-
diction, are in fact, often ignored or slighted.  In the absence of
the HIA regime where the housing impacts of local governments’
decisions are identified and considered, local officials can believe
they understand the housing needs of their residents, even when
they do not.  They may make a colorable claim to be serving their
jurisdiction’s housing needs even when they are not.223  They can
believe that they are responding to the consequences of their
own decisions on housing issues when they actually are not.  And
they can be proud of their city’s accomplishments with each
other and enjoy a good reputation among peer elected officials in
adjacent jurisdictions even when, if the spillover housing impacts
of some of their decisions were known, there would be conflict.
author believes that it could be supported both by scholarly accounts of localism,
and first hand accounts, e.g., quotes from city officials and articles from publications
that are produced for local elected officials, such as Governing Magazine .
222 Research on group norms supports the view that desire for esteem, especially
among peers, may be an end in itself for members of closely associated social
groups. See  Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of
Group Status Production and Race Discrimination , 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1028-29
(1995) (arguing that desire for esteem may be an end in itself among members of
socially connected groups and, if so, then disapproval by a peer in the forms of gos-
sip, scorn, and ostracism may be sufficient to enforce group norms).
223 In principle, “fair share” housing requirements could serve the purpose of in-
forming elected officials of the “true” housing needs in their jurisdiction.  However,
in “fair share” planning jurisdictions, the housing need numbers are widely rejected
as arbitrary and unfair.  They have not achieved legitimacy, much less normative
status, in informing elected officials about their jurisdiction’s needs. See supra  notes
77–82 and accompanying text.
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3. The Introduction of the New Norm
After the statute establishing the HIA regime is adopted, local
governments will begin to implement its procedural require-
ments.  Most local governments would be likely to at least mini-
mally comply with the procedural requirements.224
The introduction of the HIA regime disrupts the elected offi-
cials’ previously established set of mutual understandings.  The
regime interjects a new policy norm:  local governments should
avoid or mitigate significant housing impacts caused by its deci-
sions whenever feasible.  The HIA regime then causes the gener-
ation of information concerning housing impacts, and enables
broad participation in discussions about them as well as enforce-
ment of its procedural requirements.  This information and
aroused interests will challenge elected officials’ previously held
beliefs.  The information combined with public dialogue and de-
bate appealing to the new norm will create tension and conflict.
Faced with the information developed by their own planning
department that a proposed action will create significant housing
impacts and that certain other alternatives or measures will re-
duce or mitigate these housing impacts, decision-makers will be
faced with a series of new choices.
Neither the formal rules of zoning nor the procedural rules of
the HIA regime alone will “force” decision makers to heed the
new policy norm’s urged direction.225  However, if the new norm
is pressed upon them by participants in the HIA regime’s man-
dated procedures (e.g., housing advocates, residential developers
and peer local government officials), decision makers may yield
to it in part because the new policy norm “nests” within the four
principal group norms articulated above.  Mitigating significant
housing impacts when it is feasible to do so neatly fits as a sub-
norm under each of the four primary norms helping guide their
224 This analysis presumes that most local governments will comply with most
state law most of the time.  While it is conceivable that some local governments
would resist all compliance with the procedural requirements, e.g., failing to prepare
a preliminary HIA for any project at all, these governments would be subjecting
themselves to clear liability under the statute.  The procedural mandates of the HIA
regime are similar in kind to a wide variety of procedural requirements.  Courts are
competent and willing to enforce them.
225 In the author’s view, the stature and legitimacy of “law” has been severely
degraded and compromised in contemporary American society.  The effect of this is
that the mere enactment of a new law by the state or any legitimate authority (e.g., a
court) often carries little moral or educational force.
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decision making.  The information generated through the HIA
regime can support the norm that the officials know their own
residents’ needs and interests better than anyone else.  The
awareness of housing impacts in the jurisdiction and options for
reducing or mitigating them fit the officials’ sense of their role of
service to residents’ needs and interests.  The new norm’s thrust
for internalizing (some portion of) the potential spillover housing
impacts caused by the local governments’ action is consistent
with the officials’ view of themselves as responsible for the con-
sequences of their decisions.  Furthermore, the HIA regime’s
presentation of an opportunity to improve the city by mitigating
housing impacts meshes with officials’ mutual expectations that
they should make decisions supporting their pride in the city.
It is easy to imagine decision makers occasionally acknowledg-
ing that a decision will harm their residents’ housing interests,
and yet the choose not to mitigate those harms, i.e., approving a
project with known and unmitigated housing impacts.  However,
to consistently acknowledge and ignore the identified harms may
not be sustainable because of the ongoing tension such a pattern
of decision making would create both among the decision makers
and between them and the participants in the HIA processes.
Continual public rejection of the newly urged norm conflicts with
the decision makers’ established norms of responding to their re-
sidents’ needs and interests.
Several processes combine to pressure officials to accommo-
date or accept the new norm to mitigate significant housing im-
pacts when feasible.  First, among the officials themselves, the
pressure comes from the fact that, in their resistance to the ac-
tions the norms push them toward (namely, recognizing and tak-
ing action to mitigate the housing impacts of their decisions),
they are acting in ways inconsistent with their own established
group norms.  Some officials will come to a degree of accommo-
dation or acceptance of the new norm.  They may do so for many
reasons:  because they were already sympathetic to housing
needs, because they appreciate its consistency with their estab-
lished norms, or for some other reason.  Sympathetic local offi-
cials may develop rhetorical strategies towards their fellow
officials that specifically point out, on the one hand, the consis-
tency between the newly urged norm and the officials’ estab-
lished norms, and, on the other hand, the inconsistencies of the
officials’ continued rejection of the new norm while claiming to
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abide by their established norms.  Rejectionists will argue that
the subnorm is unimportant; all that counts are the procedural
rules.  They will subsume or equate the norm’s reference to “fea-
sible mitigation” as meaning whatever the local officials decide,
eschewing any external view.
Second, tension mounts between the officials and their staff as
the staff (following the procedures mandated by the statute) reg-
ularly deliver to elected officials reports identifying significant
impacts and opportunities to mitigate them, and then watch the
officials regularly ignore or dismiss the information in their ac-
tual decisions.
Third, tensions mount between the officials and the portion of
the public engaged in the HIA regime’s processes:  housing advo-
cates, residential developers (both for-profit and nonprofit), and
occasionally a resident who actually needs housing.  The public
petitions and presses the officials to pay attention to the informa-
tion and to consider the mitigation options, all the while appeal-
ing to the new norm.
Finally, elected officials of adjacent local governments who are
upset by the local governments’ consistent pattern of ignoring
housing impacts may make their displeasure clear to their peers
in more or less explicit ways.  Elected officials who look to their
peers for recognition and respect will be vulnerable to retaliation
by gossip, criticism, and complaints others voice against them be-
cause of their unwillingness to abide by the urged norm.  Some
upset neighboring officials may go further and make life difficult
for their peers by withholding help or conditioning favors, or
even by threatening and initiating litigation.
All of these actions and expressions by elected officials, staff,
members of the public, and officials of adjacent jurisdictions to-
ward the group of elected officials are efforts to establish accom-
modation or acceptance of the new norm among the officials’
already established group norms.
It is important to clarify that participants’ appeals for adoption
of the urged norm are not  appeals to deductive logic—meaning,
because the officials hold these principles they could not or
would not act in a manner which logically conflicts with them.  It
is not argued here that it is psychologically or otherwise impossi-
ble  for officials to act in ways broadly viewed as inconsistent with
their social norms, only that to do so creates and maintains ten-
sions in the working relationships with one another, their staff,
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the general public and peer officials from nearby cities.  The ar-
gument is that the enactment of the HIA regime (both its proce-
dural mandates and its newly urged norm) creates an ongoing set
of “openings” for staff, advocates, residential developers, peer
local government officials or local officials who have accepted
the subnorm to engage the other decision makers, to raise the
issues, propose solutions, and pressure them to act consistently
with the social norms they have internalized in their roles as pub-
lic servants.  This urging occurs in private meetings, small groups,
public hearings, and in the media.
Only when the officials accommodate or come to some degree
of acceptance of the new norm will the tension be reduced and
the decision makers can resume their roles with a sense of nor-
malcy. Of course, normalcy now includes a new subnorm—miti-
gating housing impacts whenever feasible—integrated into the
decision-makers’ previously established group norms.
4. The Norm Established
The subnorm may never win complete acceptance or be fully
stable, but, at a minimum, eventually the required procedures be-
come part of the routine, part of the way things are done.  This
keeps the conversation about the subnorm going.
In jurisdictions where the subnorm is accepted and legiti-
mated, it can and will be relied upon or appealed to during deci-
sion making processes.  Appeals to the subnorm may be made by
any of the participants.  Sometimes, such appeals will be success-
ful and the officials will choose to take actions which avoid or
mitigate significant impacts identified in the HIA process.  At
other times, other priorities will prevail, e.g., the fiscal conse-
quences of approving large amounts of affordable apartments or
political difficulties of restructuring a development proposal will
trump the mitigation subnorm.
Regular participants in the HIA processes begin to “internal-
ize” the subnorm into their roles in local governments’ land use
decisions.  Elected officials internalize the norm as a group norm,
but individual officials may go further and develop a personal
policy preference supporting housing.  Staff members internalize
the norm as part of their professional practice in the analysis and
reporting they perform for elected officials.  Some staff members
may develop more sympathy for housing concerns than before
the HIA regime was enacted.  Members of the public who par-
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ticipate in the HIA processes also internalize the subnorm.
Housing developers and advocates are, of course, encouraged
and empowered by the subnorm which now more widely and
publicly validates their personal preferences and commitments.
They will press to attach the subnorm tightly to the procedures,
elaborate on its meaning and consequences, try to win a place for
it as a legitimized, stable subnorm, and then draw out the conse-
quences of it in the governments’ decisions.  The procedural re-
quirements of the HIA provide the pro-housers with an array of
opportunities to keep arguing for their view, and to engage local
governments in extended conversations about the relative impor-
tance of housing in the community.
Other actors, including commercial developers, who will prob-
ably bear some financial costs from the adoption of the subnorm,
will be inclined to reject the subnorm, but they will respond to
the subnorm as reflected in the reputation and practices of each
locality.226  They will prefer to develop in another city which has
not established the subnorm.  Or they may accommodate it if a
particular development opportunity is located in a jurisdiction
which has adopted the subnorm.  If a sufficient number of juris-
dictions adopt the subnorm, even commercial developers will at
least accommodate it.  They may internalize the norm to the de-
gree and in a manner that promotes their business interests.  Spe-
cifically, they may design projects to avoid significant housing
impacts where possible, and/or they might consider how to miti-
gate unavoidable housing impacts in a manner that least disrupts
their preferred development.  They will do this in order to avoid
the HIA process or at least to reduce its potential costs and
delays.
In its attempt to establish a form of self-regulation serving the
regulator’s (i.e., state’s) policy, reflexive law intends to rely less
on litigation and more on the nonjudicial processes of establish-
ing the new norm described above.  However, it is likely that liti-
gation will play some role.  Litigation under the HIA regime in
the reflexive law view becomes a means of urging the litigant’s
desired view of the subnorm onto local governments and devel-
opers.227  Litigation still has the practical consequences of delay-
226 Cooperative housing developers will tell each other:  “OK, you’re not going to
be able to do that development in City A, try City B.  The way to get that develop-
ment approved in City Y is by doing X, Y, and Z.”  Often the informal rules are
critical.
227 If litigation is used, the courts’ treatment of the issues, in particular how they
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ing a decision, imposing costs on local government and, if it is a
proposed development, on a developer.  In some cases, the liti-
gant may win a particular concession on a particular project, but
have no influence on the adoption of the urged subnorm.  In fact,
depending upon how it was pursued, litigation could backfire.
Eventually, decisions and practices guided by the subnorm
would generate procedural norms (e.g., mutual understandings
about under what conditions “scoping meetings” would be held
and who would be invited to attend them) and analytical norms
(which methodology would normally be applied to measure the
potential significance of a particular type of housing impact).  A
methodology used and refined over a period of time would, in
practice, become the “standard” for a city and develop a norma-
tive character.  Local governments which mutually consider
themselves to be in the same regional housing, labor and trans-
portation market will develop local norms in awareness of each
other.  The housing impact mitigation subnorm would lead to the
adoption of mitigation policies (e.g., a housing impact or
“linkage” fee for commercial development) in some localities.
Eventually, most governments would at least accommodate the
HIA regime to some degree.  Others would embrace it more
completely. Cumulatively, these changes would serve the state’s
housing goals substantially better than the previous regime.
The preceding is a story of the successful establishment of
“self-regulation” by norms.  The introduction of the new sub-
norm by the HIA regime has changed the relationships among
the participants in the land use development process to coordi-
nate the pursuit of their own goals and interests in a way that
better serves the state’s housing goals.  While the participants’
roles have been changed, their core interests have not.  Elected
officials still want to lead the city, balance competing interests
and get re-elected.  For-profit developers still want to maximize
their profits and reduce the delays and costs of the approval pro-
cess.  Housing advocates still want to press for more housing, es-
pecially for the most needy, and to prioritize housing over other
interests.
In essence, the HIA regime launches a long-term, mul-
tileveled, practical “conversation” in each local government
might directly or indirectly enforce the subnorm, might be critical to the success of
the HIA regime.  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article and is the subject of
further research by the author.
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about what the subnorm means, whether it will be accepted to
any degree, what place it will have among the norms local offi-
cials already accept, and how the norm should apply to any given
decision in a locality.
Of course, the HIA regime may not operate at all as this story
suggests.  The point in articulating the success story is to offer a
plausible (and persuasive) account of how the HIA regime might
work according to reflexive law theory’s own terms.  This story
passes over numerous contingencies and uncertainties, any of
which could thwart the establishment of the subnorm and its op-
eration to serve the state’s policy.  Local officials may truly be
“captured” and their social norms impermeable.  There could be
interminable squabbling about methodology, preventing con-
structive negotiations about feasible mitigations.  Bad history,
soured personal relationships, professional jealousies or any
number of other distortions in relationships among the partici-
pants could undermine the possibility of the regime inculcating a
new form of coordination among the participants.  Instead of act-
ing to urge adoption of the new subnorm, adjacent local govern-
ments might conspire to form an exclusive region that revels in
its exclusivity.  Elected officials may be so unreflective and thick-
skinned that their reputation among their peers does not affect
them.  In response to the urged norm, the typical norms underly-
ing localism may be reformulated to support mutual denial and
resistance to the subnorm because of its origin:  the state is at-
tempting to force this onto us.  The interdependence of cities in a
region may be weak because of variable sizes and strengths, so
that nonjudicial attempts at enforcing the subnorm against peer
officials may be ineffective.  Vulnerabilities of this story could
easily be multiplied.
Even on the best of assumptions, changing established norms
is likely to be difficult.228  Whether such urging is successful or
228 Professor Briffault’s early work on “our localism” suggests that localism norms
may be particularly resistant to change. See  Briffault, Our Localism:  Part I , supra
note 45.  More recently, Professors Briffault and Barron view localism not as a fully
defined, closed ideology in a zero sum conflict with regionalism or centralized regu-
lation, but as a more complex and malleable set of positions.  Professor Barron’s
insight that certain centralized commands “may promote local autonomy by altering
the background legal structure in a way that protects local governments from the
costs that the current, centrally established legal frameworks permits local govern-
ments to impose upon their neighbors,” suggests that local governments might wel-
come the HIA regime because it will empower them to defend against the housing
impacts that their neighboring governments have traditionally imposed upon them.
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not will depend on many variables, some of which may not be
identifiable before the adoption of the HIA regime.  Established
norms are more likely to accommodate revision when the newly
urged norm builds upon  established stable norms, as the HIA’s
“feasible mitigation” norm attempts to do.229  In this case, the
housing impact mitigation subnorm can be interpreted as adding
to the dominant norms of localism instead of challenging
them.230  If successfully adopted, the HIA regime effects not a
wholesale change, but only a reformulation of the previously es-
tablished norms.  It would also build upon existing familiar pro-
cedural practices.  Most local governments are familiar with
NEPA and many are familiar with implementing their state’s
SEPA requirements.  This familiarity will tend to focus attention
on the substance of the new mandate rather than its procedures.
C. Two Overlapping Paradigms?
While much of the overt behavior of participants in the HIA
regime would be the same in both paradigms, e.g., attending
meetings, providing comments and testimony, and filing lawsuits,
the paradigms are not simply different descriptions of the same
David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism , 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 378
(2001).
229 In contrast, the Mt. Laurel litigation, comprehensive “fair share” housing plan-
ning requirements, and legislative overrides of local decisions under Massachusetts’s
“Anti-Snob” law can be understood to urge norms that the state or some regional
planning entity knows residents’ needs and interests better than the elected officials;
that local governments are responsible for housing needs of other jurisdictions; that
local officials ought not to feel proud of their city, but perhaps ashamed because of
its “selfishness” and exclusivity.  These norms conflict directly and substantively with
what has been presented as the typical social norms of local governments.  Needless
to say, versions of strong regionalism (such as in the Portland, Oregon region) com-
pletely upend these typical social norms.  The procedural and analytical practices
and norms of these attempted reforms are also mostly foreign to local governments’
typical practices.  On this view, it is not surprising that these norms and the regula-
tory strategies they support have rarely been accepted or accommodated, even with
the force of law behind them.  Sometimes, this resistance leads to legislative back-
lash weakening the original law.  In the face of dozens of bills to revise Massachu-
sett’s “Anti-Snob” law, the legislature has made several changes weakening the
program. See MASS. DEP’T OF HOUSING & CMTY. DEV., SUMMARY OF RECENT 40B
REGULATORY CHANGES 1 (2001) at  http://www.state. ma.us/dhcd/Ch40Btf/
RegChg.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).  A state task force has proposed further
changes.  See CHAPTER 40B TASK FORCE, REPORT ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, (2003) at  http://www.mhp.net/termsheets/Chapter40 Bexec.pdf (last visited
Jan. 18, 2004).
230 In this sense, the HIA regime is similar to Professor Payne’s “growth share
proposal.” See  Payne, supra  note 82.
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phenomenon.  Rather, they are distinct regulatory paradigms.  It
might be suggested that the representation paradigm is a view of
regulation in the short term, while the reflexive law paradigm ex-
plains how the HIA regime might work in the long term.  How-
ever, there is no necessary reason to believe that the
representative regulatory paradigm would later morph into the
reflexive law paradigm.
A primary difference between the paradigms is that in the re-
flexive law model, the relationships and roles of the participants
change as they become coordinated in a form of “self-regula-
tion.”  Their participation in the regime under the influence of
the subnorm reforms the ways they each pursue their still-con-
flicting interests.  Advocates who were “outsiders,” now become
constructively engaged “insiders,” affecting housing policy and
decisions with their ideas.  They may become more aware of and
responsive to other interests’ needs without losing sense of their
own core interests.  When decision makers, developers, and
other participants have internalized the subnorm, the policy goal
begins to be served without any visible exertion of power by
housing advocates or regulatory beneficiaries.231
In contrast, the representative regulatory model does not fore-
see or expect any changed roles among the participants, but only
a change in the balance of power among them due to the forma-
tion of a strong local housing movement.  Under this view, the
level and type of conflicts and confrontations existing between
the competing interests before the enactment of the HIA regime
continue and may even deepen.  This helps explain why the rep-
resentative model relies so much more on judicial enforcement to
produce its results.232
Yet, there remain indications of overlap between the para-
digms.  For example, in the representative paradigm, commercial
developers might accommodate the HIA based upon calculations
of rational self-interest.  A similar phenomenon occurs in the re-
231 In the British philosopher Steven Lukes’ three dimensional model of power,
one important dimension of power is to set the agenda and have your interests taken
care of without having to assert them. STEVEN LUKES, POWER READINGS IN SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY 4 (1986).  To get a sense of this, compare decision-makers
thirty years ago to today regarding their sense of how protecting the environment is
a part of their “role.”
232 In contrast, in the reflexive law model, patently manipulative threats of litiga-
tion or abusive litigation tactics would discredit the advocate’s standing among the
participants in the HIA regime.  In this sense, even the resort to litigation under the
reflexive law regime is part of the regime’s self-regulation.
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flexive law paradigm, but the mechanism is the developer’s inter-
nalization of the established mitigation of the housing impacts
subnorm.  The primary mechanisms of each paradigm would be
mutually reinforcing:  to the degree the HIA regime spawned a
local housing movement, decision-makers are likely to accommo-
date or adopt the new norm, and vice versa.
D. Evaluating the Benefits, Costs and Risks of the
HIA Regime
If it was effective, the HIA regime would advance state hous-
ing policy by integrating housing concerns into the broad range
of local governments’ decisions affecting housing.233  It would do
so in such a manner respecting local governments’ traditional ex-
pectations for local control.  It would also treat local govern-
ments fairly because the HIA regime requires local governments
to consider and mitigate (when feasible) only the housing im-
pacts created by their own voluntary decisions.
If they were each effective on their own terms,234 both regimes
would generate many similar benefits for housing.235  Initially,
233 An HIA regime would be one part of a set of policies states could use to serve
their housing goals.
234 As discussed, in Part II, supra , effectiveness of an impact assessment strategy
will in general depend upon:  (1) the conceptual framework; (2) the policy area; (3)
the institutional context in which the requirement is added; (4) the design of the
requirement; (5) the legal context in which the requirement is added; and, (6) the
judicial review and enforcement.
235 Given this proposal’s tentative acceptance of localism, two difficult issues re-
quire some response.  First, will the housing needs encompassed and addressed by
an effective HIA regime equal the total “actual” housing needs of a state (however
these are measured)?  In other words, if the HIA were successful, would the mitiga-
tion provision (however enforced) require local governments to meet all the housing
needs that exist.  At the theoretical level, this is an important and complex issue
which requires additional research.  On the practical level, this proposal alone can-
not promise to meet all housing needs because, among other things, substantial addi-
tional subsidy would be necessary to do so.  Second, what effect would the HIA
regime have on racial and economic segregation, and in particular exclusionary zon-
ing?  In a manner similar to Professor Payne’s “growth share” proposal, the HIA
regime looks forward to potential future effects of current proposals. See  Payne,
supra  note 82.  Yet, the HIA regime could make a contribution to reducing racial
and economic segregation.  When historically exclusionary governments sought
commercial development that would create significant housing impacts affecting
their neighbors who have historically provided more housing in the past, the exclu-
sionary regime would become vulnerable to enforcement by adjacent local govern-
ments who would otherwise experience the effects of the spillover impacts.  (The
CEQA housing impact lawsuits suggests that, at least in some cases, such enforce-
ment would be pursued.)  Thus, even if the HIA regime would not undo prior effects
of segregation, it would condition exclusionary governments’ ability to site addi-
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the imposition of the HIA regime would “transform the institu-
tional landscape,” as NEPA did when it was first adopted.236  The
benefits to housing from these regulatory paradigms would ac-
crue in the following way:  Staff as well as appointed and elected
officials would learn more about the actual housing needs in their
communities, the housing impacts caused by their decisions, and
the policies and practices that promote housing.  To some degree,
greater awareness and understanding will make them more likely
to attend to residents’ housing needs.
The HIA requirement would create a precondition to actions
that may have a negative impact on housing.  The HIA process
would identify avoidable harms to housing that would have oc-
curred without housing impact consideration.  The HIA regime
would delay, revise, and in some cases block actions that could
harm housing.  Local governments would begin to take advan-
tage of previously overlooked opportunities to reduce and miti-
gate housing impacts presented by proposed developments, e.g.,
by negotiating more mixed-use projects with developers to incor-
porate a residential component into a retail or commercial
project.
More proposed housing developments would be approved.
For example, local governments could approve specific housing
development in the face of community opposition more often
and with less reduction in units/density and increased af-
fordability.237  Housing would be favored more when tradeoffs
are required because the HIA process requires the articulation of
both housing impacts and competing needs, instead of housing
interests being left out of the balancing altogether.
Finally, local governments would adopt more policies and
practices that promote housing.  For example, in order to miti-
gate negative housing impacts, local governments will zone more
land for residential use and at higher densities.  Other policies
that promote housing, e.g., inclusionary zoning, housing impact
linkage, and density incentives, would be adopted.  Localities
tional commercial and other desired land uses on their responding to their neigh-
bors’ concern about additional impacts.
236 Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA , supra  note 104, at 906 (distinguishing
NEPA’s initial impact with its “quiescent and unproductive middle age”).
237 See  Iglesias, Managing Local Opposition , supra  note 52, at 94 (explaining how
local decision makers sometimes rely on laws that strictly speaking do not compel
approval of a housing development to “do the right thing” on housing proposals in
the face of community opposition to a meritorious proposal).
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would also revise their infrastructure plans and expenditures
when cognizant of their housing impacts.
Though calculated to accept the contemporary dominance of
“localism,” the HIA regime would support movement towards
regionalism by creating a new form of coordination among local
governments concerning housing.  If a form of strong regionalism
were realized, the HIA regime could be incorporated into it.
Like any regulation, the HIA regime brings costs and risks.
Like any regulatory regime, the HIA process may, in some in-
stances, be “burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive, and
sometimes out of proportion to the ultimate benefits.”238  Costs
of the HIA include direct administrative and staffing costs, due
to compliance with the procedural mandates for the production
and dissemination of the required analyses.  Some of the costs
would be paid by the government in staffing; presumably local
government would pass these costs on to developers for specific
development projects as is the practice in many jurisdictions for
environmental analysis.  There would be additional costs for time
spent in public hearings, and in reading and drafting responses to
comments received from interested parties.  The HIA process
would cause some delays in some specific development proposals
leading to financing and other carrying costs.  Legal fees could be
the most significant cost for local governments challenged by in-
terested parties.  These can be expected to be greater in the rep-
resentation paradigm than the reflexive law paradigm.
Both local governments and developers could incur costs for
mitigation measures.  Local governments would incur costs for
rezoning or the development and application of other policies.  If
projects are revised to reduce or avoid housing impacts, there
would be redesign fees and other “soft development” costs.
The risks of the HIA requirement include economic waste and
opportunity costs.  Because litigation and threats of litigation
may be important in enforcing HIA’s requirements, the possibil-
ity of frivolous and even extortionist litigation arises.239
238 ERIC BREGMAN & ARTHUR JACOBSON, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE RE-
VIEW 497 (1994) (describing NEPA’s EIS requirement).
239 The statute enacting a HIA requirement could be designed to minimize and
deter such lawsuits.  For suggestions to curb such abuse in the environmental con-
text, see Mark Vandervelden, Is the State Environmental Act an Endangered Spe-
cies? , 45 CAL. LAW., Apr. 1984; Sean Stuart Varner, The California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA) After Two Decades:  Relevant Problems and Ideas for Neces-
sary Reform , 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1447 (1992) (highlighting specific instances of abuse
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The weighing of costs and benefits is inherently subjective
since the valuation of additional housing produced by the HIA
regime is not strictly commensurable with the economic costs
caused by the regulation.  In light of our nation’s chronic housing
crisis and the profound importance of adequate and affordable
housing to families and individuals, on balance, the HIA regime
appears likely to successfully promote state housing goals at an
acceptable social cost.
CONCLUSION:  EACH STATE SHOULD ADOPT A HOUSING
IMPACT ASSESSMENT REGIME
Our chronic housing crisis takes its toll daily in the lives of
children and families, more recently among those of moderate
income.  In principle, the lack of decent, affordable housing—
unlike crime, drug abuse, and other social ills—is a solvable  so-
cial problem.  We know how to design, build, and maintain de-
cent housing.  Local governments ought to be a primary focus of
housing policy because they have the capacity to be a major
source of the problem, but also to make significant contributions
to the solution.  Yet, many local governments do not exercise
their discretion to promote state housing goals.  Housing needs
and interests are regularly ignored and slighted in local govern-
ments’ decision making.  What is required to engage local gov-
ernments in solving our housing problem is no less than a
regulatory strategy that would integrate  consideration of housing
concerns into every facet of their land use decision making.
Only states have both the power and legitimacy to impose such
comprehensive regulation of local governments’ exercise of dis-
cretion in land use decisions affecting housing.  However, the
regulatory challenge facing states considering this task is severe.
Several states have tried to force local governments to serve state
housing goals with only limited success.  No existing state hous-
ing policy stands out as a successful and widely replicable model.
Moreover, any attempt to impose regulation on discretionary
land use decisions—a premier arena of local control—is bound
to encounter resistance.
A HIA requirement appears to hold out the promise of a regu-
latory strategy achieving the objectives while both respecting the
that adversarial groups effect through the environmental impact report procedural
process and recommending reforms).
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limits of states’ competence to comprehensively regulate housing
and the exigencies of our enduring localism.
The HIA regime could be effective in either or both of two
regulatory paradigms.  In one paradigm, the state regulates by
enabling the formation of local housing movements pressuring
and restraining local governments to serve state housing goals.
Alternatively, employing the same HIA regime under reflexive
law theory, the state regulates by urging local governments to
adopt a new housing impact mitigation norm consistent with lo-
calism’s typical norms, but which will promote state housing
policy.
The costs and risks of the two paradigms are similar, and the
potential benefits from either paradigm could be significant.
Like the state environmental acts modeled on NEPA, the HIA
regime could be easily adapted to the circumstances of particular
states.  While some local governments’ resistance is expected, the
underlying premise of the HIA regime accepts localism, so resis-
tance should be limited.  In the face of our chronic housing crisis
and the states’ unique authority to regulate local governments’
discretion in land use decision making, each state should adopt a
version of the HIA regime modified to fit its circumstances.
